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Abstract 
 
Access to consumer credit is influenced by many factors, such as amount and security of the 
consumer’s income, and credit card company and financial institution practices. Access is 
also driven by social, cultural and cognitive factors, including consumer understanding of the 
cost of credit; perceptions regarding ability to repay; cognitive influences regarding immediate 
consumption and delayed payment; understanding of the benefits and risks of debt to 
economic security; and the conflicts of interest inherent in the business of lending. Overall, 
bank and credit union credit has tightened since the global financial crisis. However, the 
study found that for many Canadians, the issue is less whether there is access to credit, but 
rather, “access to credit at what high cost and on what terms and conditions”.   
 
Much of the reported need for credit in the past two years has been the need to bridge 
income loss from job loss, reduced hours of employment and small business failures.  Many 
individuals that could not access personal loans from their bank or credit union turned to 
alternate, more expensive, forms of credit, such as merchandise finance company loans, 
increasing credit card debt, skipping monthly payments on loans, and payday loans.  
Consolidation loans have been increasingly viewed as a debt management strategy, yet 
there are problems associated with consolidation. One issue identified was the growth in 
home equity lines of credit, originally intended to bridge financing for emergencies or a 
significant purchase, but now being used more akin to account withdrawing, portending future 
issues in respect to debt load and longer term economic security. 
 
Consumers face the direct costs of high interest rate charges and loan and broker fees. 
There is evidence to suggest that costs increase when consumer borrowers do not 
understand how interest rates and terms work, and thus consumer debtors may be paying 
considerably more for their credit than they need to. The lack of financial literacy is a major 
concern in that many consumer debtors do not fully appreciate the costs of carrying 
expensive credit, identified as particularly an issue among younger adults and recent 
immigrants to Canada. Yet to date, financial literacy training does not align with consumer 
debtors’ particular needs for financing based on income and a range of other factors. There 
are also significant indirect costs to the consumer of access only to expensive credit, such as 
foregone basic necessities because of excessive debt load, health outcomes and costs 
associated with the stress of over-indebtedness, and the costs to society, borne by creditors 
                                            
1
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or the general tax base, when consumers default on loans or file for insolvency or 
bankruptcy.  
 
Analysis of the causes of insolvency for a cohort of 4,000 consumer insolvency cases from 
2008 to 2010 indicates that “access to credit” forms an extremely small percentage of 
declared reasons for filing bankruptcy or proposals under the BIA.  Related causes are much 
higher. For bankruptcies, insufficient income accounted for 30.5% of insolvency, 
unemployment for 18.8%, and over-indebtedness for 12.4%. For proposals, insufficient 
income accounted for 40.7% of insolvency, unemployment for 15.8%, and over-indebtedness 
for 13.8%.  Seeking relief under Canadian insolvency law is reported by bankrupts as less 
associated with access to credit and more an outcome of consumer debtors’ inability to meet 
the payment demands of expensive credit they previously accessed. 
 
Credit card debt is a significant issue for consumer debtors. The average credit card debt was 
$21,620 and the median debt was $13,979. The data show that 90% of all debtors filing for 
insolvency relief had credit card debt.  Equally, however, mortgage debt, personal loans and 
finance company debt are significant factors in filing, evidence of credit behaviour that 
catches consumer debtors in a repeated pattern of refinancing expensive debt and re-
incurring it, which can expedite financial distress.  
 
Considerably more research and policy development is required to make consumer access to 
credit more understandable, affordable and accessible on a fair and reasonable basis. While 
financial literacy is an important goal, there is also an urgent need for the federal government 
to complement its current work in financial literacy with a much more comprehensive program 
regarding consumer credit. 
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At What Cost? Access to Consumer Credit in a Post-Financial Crisis Canada 
 
 
Janis Sarra 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
The issues involving consumer debt and consumer access to credit are complex. There has 
been a steady rise in household debt levels over the last 20 years, and the ratio of Canadian 
household debt to disposable income reached 148 percent in 2010.2  The 2009 Canadian 
Financial Capability Survey reported that 31% of Canadians were struggling to meet their bills 
and payments.3 One question is whether access to credit is the issue, or whether it is the type 
and cost of credit that is problematic. 
 
Access to consumer credit is driven by external factors, such as amount and security of 
consumers’ income, and credit card company and financial institution practices. Yet access is 
also driven by social, cultural and cognitive factors, including consumer understanding of the 
cost of credit; perceptions regarding ability to repay; understanding of the benefits and risks 
of debt to economic security; and the conflicts of interest inherent in the business of lending. 
 
This paper discusses the results of a study that explored the extent to which Canadian banks 
and credit unions have altered their lending practices vis à vis consumer debtors in the past 
several years. It discusses the issues associated with access to consumer credit and its 
relationship to consumer insolvency.  Overall, the research found that lower cost credit has 
tightened considerably since the global financial crisis, such as personal lines of credit, bank 
and credit union loans and in some regions, mortgages. Such tightening is more of a 
business decision on the part of traditional banks and credit unions to curb growing default 
rates than it is a more systemic restructuring of how consumers access credit. 
 
The study found that, for many Canadians, the issue is less whether there is access to credit, 
but rather, “access to credit at what high cost and on what terms and conditions”.  Much of 
the reported need for credit in the past two years has been the need to bridge income loss 
from job loss, reduced hours of employment and small business failures that were the direct 
or indirect result of reduced economic activity in Canada in the wake of the financial crisis.  
Many individuals that could not access personal loans from their bank or credit union turned 
to alternate, more expensive, forms of credit, such as merchandise finance company loans, 
increasing credit card debt, skipping monthly payments on loans, and payday loans.  
Consolidation loans have been increasingly viewed as a debt management strategy, yet 
there are problems associated with consolidation. One issue identified is the growth in home 
equity lines of credit, originally intended to bridge financing for emergencies or a significant 
                                            
2
 Statistics Canada. CANSIM table 378–0012.  
3
 Task Force on Financial Literacy (TFFL); www.financialliteracyincanada.com, at 12, the background 
study finding also that of those Canadians who were planning to purchase a home, 48 percent had 
saved less than five percent of the cost of the home. Fifty-two percent of Canadians who were planning 
to purchase a home were not expecting to incur any costs other than the down payment; 70% of 
Canadians were confident that their retirement income would provide the standard of living they hoped 
for, although only 40% had a good idea of how much money they needed to save in order to maintain 
their desired standard of living in retirement; and financial advisors are  the most likely source (at 54 
percent) among Canadians seeking advice on financial matters. See also S. McKay, “Understanding 
financial capability in Canada: Analysis of the CFCS”, (2010), research paper prepared for the Task 
Force on Financial Literacy; www.financialliteracyincanada.com. 
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purchase, but now being used more akin to account withdrawing, portending future issues in 
respect to debt load and longer term economic security. 
 
The title of this paper, “At What Cost”, refers to a number of aspects of access to credit. It 
refers to the direct costs, such as interest rate charges and loan and broker fees. It refers to 
costs that increase when consumer borrowers do not understand how interest rates and 
terms work, and thus are paying more for their credit than they may need to. It also refers to 
the indirect costs to the consumer of access to expensive credit, such as foregone basic 
necessities because of excessive debt load, health outcomes and costs associated with the 
stress of over-indebtedness, and the costs to society, borne by creditors or the general tax 
base, when consumers default on loans or file for insolvency or bankruptcy. 
 
Considerably more research and policy development is required to make consumer access to 
credit more understandable, affordable and accessible on a fair and reasonable basis. While 
financial literacy is one important piece of the puzzle, it is not the only piece, and there is an 
urgent need for the federal government to complement its current work in financial literacy 
with a much more comprehensive program regarding consumer credit. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Part II briefly discusses the methodology of the study.  
Part III sets a context for consumer access to credit, analyzing the overall situation and 
examining some of the research on this issue. Part IV offers some high level data from a 
sample cohort of 4,000 consumer insolvency files.  Part V examines a series of issues 
relating to consumer access to credit and consumer debt, including mortgage debt held later 
in life, home equity lines of credit, the link between employment, income and capacity to 
manage debt, implications of credit card debt for access to credit, rising default rates on 
personal loans, problems associated with payday lending and financial literacy. The paper 
offers preliminary suggestions and identifies areas in need of future research. 
 
 
II.  Methodology 
 
The methodology for this study was multifaceted, involving a literature search, data analysis 
and surveys of both professionals and consumers.  In all instances, the appropriate ethics 
approvals were sought and received, and consent protocols followed.  
 
There is extensive literature regarding access to consumer credit, much of it generated by the 
United States (US) and located in finance and economics literature, with a growing literature 
in law. There has been little comparable work in Canada. An under-explored question is the 
relationship between consumer insolvency and banking practices, including traditional 
domestic banks, foreign banks operating in Canada, credit unions and finance companies.   
 
The study undertook analysis of a database provided by the Office of the Superintendent of 
Bankruptcy (OSB) of 4,000 recent consumer insolvency filings, specifically, 3,118 
bankruptcies and 882 consumer proposals, primarily Division II consumer proposals, but with 
a representative cohort of Division I consumer proposals. There were 846 Division II debtors 
in the cohort and 36 Division I, which the OSB advises was proportionate to the filings by 
consumer debtors by type of proposal in that time period. “Division” refers to the section of 
the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act under which the debtor files.  The data were drawn from a 
randomized sample of filings across Canada for the period of August 1, 2008 to July 31, 
2010. The data were drawn primarily from the Form 79, Statement of Affairs (Non-Business 
Bankruptcy/Proposal); and Form 65, Monthly Income and Expense Statement of the 
Bankrupt/Debtor and the Family Unit and Information (or Amended Information) Concerning 
the Financial Situation of the Individual Bankrupt, for bankruptcies, division 1 and division II 
proposals.  
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The study examined particular features of the entire cohort, such as income, assets and 
liabilities; and then focused specifically on the files that identified lack of access to credit or 
over-indebtedness as the declared principal cause of insolvency. The data produced some 
interesting results, as discussed in Part IV below. However, results may be premature in 
terms of understanding the full effect of the financial crisis, given the time lag between 
changing economic circumstances and the decision to file insolvency proceedings. Further 
follow up with data over the next two years would be helpful to policy development. 
 
The research also included a qualitative survey of twenty credit counsellors across Canada, 
their services covering most geographical parts of the country. Most Canadian credit 
counselling services are charitable not-for-profit agencies, and in 2009-2010, they served 
more than 250,000 Canadians representing nearly $1.248 billion of unsecured consumer 
debt.4  However, the credit industry has a very powerful influence over these services as it 
provides the bulk of funding support, participates on boards of directors of such agencies, 
and has former credit managers that now work as credit counsellors.  There is also some 
normative debate as to the extent of such agencies offering counselling services as opposed 
to acting as debt collection services.5 The credit counsellors interviewed for this study did 
offer some helpful observations about access to credit. 
 
The credit counsellors were asked five questions; specifically: whether they had seen a rise 
in default rates on mortgages, personal loans or small business loans (sole proprietors) since 
October 2008 in the communities they serve and to what degree; whether there were any 
factors in their local community or region that have made access to credit for consumers 
particularly difficult since the financial crisis; what, in their view, should be changed in respect 
of access to consumer credit; and were there any other issues they wished to discuss 
regarding access to consumer credit, based on their experience as credit counsellors? 
 
Surveys were also conducted of bank managers and credit union managers, with questions 
similar to those asked of creditor counsellors, but focusing on lending patterns at their 
institution. Here, there was considerable resistance to speaking with us, even though the 
consent forms, the proposed questions, and explanation of the study were sent in advance. 
Overall, 35 managers agreed to be interviewed; another 82 refused to participate, primarily 
because they could not receive permission from their head office, and another 95 simply did 
not respond to letters, e-mails or telephone calls or advised that they were too busy. 
Managers that we did successfully interview were drawn from Vancouver, Victoria, Burnaby, 
Saskatoon, Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Toronto, Hamilton, Montréal, Québec City, 
Halifax, and Charlottetown, and so their views do offer a good cross-section of regional 
observations. Managers in smaller cities were particularly willing to offer their candid and 
helpful insights.  
 
“On-the-street” interviews were also conducted, although these interviews are of questionable 
research value and produced at best only anecdotal information.  It took a canvass of almost 
1,000 people to acquire 238 interviews in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montréal. 
Individuals were also given the opportunity to take away the questions and consent forms 
and respond at a later time, but only three surveys were completed in this manner. The age 
range of respondents was approximately 33% under age 30; 58% aged 31 to 60; and 9% 
over aged 60. Different locations made a difference in the response rate, in terms of types of 
neighbourhoods and regions of the country. In particular, consumer debtors entering or 
exiting payday loan outlets were reluctant to participate in the survey. Interviewees were 
                                            
4
 Adriana Molina, “Financial Literacy and the Canadian Credit Counselling Services Industry”, 2010, 
Research paper prepared for the Task Force on Financial Literacy, 
http://www.financialliteracyincanada.com/documents/research-reports.html at 7. All dollars referred to 
in this paper are Canadian dollars, unless otherwise noted. 
5
 See for example, E. Uribe and A. Tait, “Credit Counselling: A Way Forward”, Public Interest Advocacy 
Group, March 2007. 
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asked five questions, after being informed of the scope and objectives of the study and giving 
the appropriate consent.  They were asked whether they have had trouble gaining access to 
credit in the past two years, such as credit cards, a home mortgage or a personal loan. They 
were asked whether or not they had used pay-day loans, and if so, what their experience 
was. They were asked about missed loan or credit card payments in the past two years, and 
if so, the reason. They were asked what percentage of credit card debt they held in relation to 
their total annual income; and they were asked for any other views they might have regarding 
access to credit. 
 
The data from the on-the-street interviews were not particularly helpful as the sample was too 
small and too random. Thus, it is not discussed in the paper. For purposes of completeness, 
however, it is summarized here in very cursory fashion, because it does resonate with the 
observations and data below. Overall, only 11% reported access to credit problems, a 
number of people suggesting that access was perhaps too easy. However, 27% expressed 
concern about high interest rates for the debt they did have. 9% had accessed payday loans, 
and generally did not have a good experience, offering comments such as “once they get 
their hooks into you, it is hard to get away”. 34% reported they had missed credit card 
payments in the past two years, and in the vast majority of cases, it was due to forgetting or 
not really paying attention to timing of payments; the remainder reported using credit card 
finance to bridge job loss for basic necessities. In response to questions regarding the 
amount of credit card debt as a percentage of annual average income, 12% reported no 
credit card outstanding balance; 18% reported it was 10% or less; 24% reported that it was 
11% to 20% of total income; 9% said it was 21% to 30%; 10% more than 40%; and 27% had 
no idea of what it might be. Responses we did hear repeatedly included that there should be 
stricter confidentiality policies for banks handing out customer information; that banks should 
stop pushing people to get more credit cards; that credit to students and individuals without 
steady employment just sets them up for future failure; that the debt culture now is that 
younger adults do not understand debt until they have a huge amount of debt; and finally, 
that bank profits are too high and some of those profits should be directed towards lower loan 
and credit card interest rates. 
 
What is evident from all of these initiatives to collect data is that there is truly a paucity of 
information on consumer access to credit in Canada and the relationship between the various 
forms of credit and financial distress. Considerably more resources, as well as more fulsome 
access to credit information, are essential prerequisites to more meaningful data analysis. 
 
One objective of the study had been to make policy recommendations in respect of federal 
banking practices regarding consumer debtors. While this paper does contain some 
suggestions, the multifaceted methodology revealed that there is still too much opaqueness 
in the information to offer comprehensive recommendations at this early stage of research.  
The study does establish that consumer lending practices have shifted considerably in recent 
years and that they are currently in a state of flux. The multiple options available to consumer 
borrowers and the lack of transparency around terms and true costs means that considerably 
more research is needed before government can truly coordinate its policy and practices with 
respect to financial literacy and insolvency with banking and other credit practices. 
 
 
III.  Context 
 
We know that there is linkage between quantum of consumer debt and insolvency. Studies 
over the past several years have documented the degree to which consumers are in debt 
when they file for bankruptcy or seek to negotiate a proposal with their creditors. The link with 
consumer access to credit is less clear, yet appears intuitively to be the case. Individuals 
often access credit because they expect their incomes to grow, allowing them to service a 
greater level of debt. They also access credit to smooth liquidity shocks such as medical 
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support bills or job loss.6 Households in many countries, including Canada, experienced 
substantial increases in access to credit in the late 1990s; the greatest gains occurred, 
according to one US study, for low-income households and minority groups.7 One reason for 
the increase was that credit was extended to higher risk borrowers, but a higher interest rate 
was charged to compensate for any increase of risk to the lender.8  
 
Currently, most of the research on consumer access to credit comes from the US, and within 
that literature, there is no consensus on whether access to consumer credit is beneficial or 
harmful to consumer debtors.9 While, generally, access to credit for businesses of all sizes is 
viewed as stimulating economic growth, there is normative disagreement about both the 
individual and overall effects of greater access to consumer credit.10 There is also a 
contested literature in respect of liberalized access to credit and the incidence of consumer 
insolvency in the US.11   
 
Buckland, Montgomerie and others have observed that economic growth in the 1990s was 
“consumer debt-led growth”, referring to debt-financed consumer spending as a principal 
instrument to stimulate macroeconomic growth, where consumer debtors were encouraged to 
continue to spend to keep the economy moving, increasing their debt loads at a time when 
wage levels were stagnant.12  With the onset of the global financial crisis, consumer debtors 
were not able to sustain payments on the amount of debt they held. 
 
According to the Certified General Accountants Association of Canada, household debt in 
Canada, which includes mortgages and credit card debt, was at an all-time high of $1.41 
trillion in December 2009.13  Statscan reports that the ratio of household credit market debt to 
personal disposable income was 146.8% in December 2010.14 The per capita amount of 
                                            
6
 Berrak Büyükkarabaca and Neven Valev, “The role of household and business credit in banking 
crises”, (2010) 34 Journal of Banking and Finance 1247 at 1248; O. E. Ergungor, “Bank Branch 
Presence and Access to Credit in Low to Moderate-Income Neighborhoods”, (2010) 42 Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 1321 at 1322. 
7
 J. Fisher and A. Lyons, “Information and Credit Access: Using Bankruptcy as a Signal”, (2010) 42 
Applied Economics 3175-3193. 
8
 Ibid. at 3175; W. Edelberg, “Risk-based pricing of interest rates in consumer loans”, (2006) 53 
Journal of Monetary Economics 2283-2298. 
9
 Jonathan Zinman, “Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household Survey Evidence on Effects 
around the Oregon Rate Cap”, (2009) 34 Journal of Banking and Finance, no. 3, 546-556. 
10
 Ibid. at 1. 
11
 Elizabeth Warren and A. Warren Tyagi, The Two Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers & 
Fathers Are Going Broke, (2003: Basic Books, New York) who have empirical data offering a direct 
link. In contrast, Igor Livshits and James MacGee and Michele Tertilt, “Accounting for the Rise in 
Consumer Bankruptcies”, Bank of Canada Working Paper, 2005, http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/bankruptcy_rise.pdf, find that an increase in income shocks and expense 
uncertainty cannot quantitatively account for the rise in US bankruptcies; rather, they find that a 
combination of a decrease in the credit market transactions cost together with a decline in “stigma” 
accounts for the rise in consumer bankruptcy in the US. See also Bruno Biasis and Thomas Mariotti. 
“Credit, Wages and Bankruptcy Laws” (2009) 7 Journal of the European Economic Association no. 5, 
939-973. 
12
 Jerry Buckland, “Affordable Credit Options for Vulnerable Consumers: Identifying Alternatives to High-
cost Credit in Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the UK, & the US”, Research Report for the 
Canadian Consumer Measures Committee, November 2, 2010 at 8, citing Montgomarie, 2007 at 170. 
13
 Dilip Soman, “The Trouble with Consumer Credit: Literacy Considerations and Policy 
Implications”, (2010), Research paper prepared for the Task Force on Financial Literacy; 
www.financialliteracyincanada.com, at 5. 
14
 Statscan, March 2011 Indicators, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/110314/t110314a2-
eng.htm.  
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household debt was $44,500 in December 2010.15 Statscan offers the following graph to 
illustrate the pattern of household credit market debt to net worth over the past seven years: 
 
 
Graph 1 Household credit market debt to net worth, 2003 to 2010 
 
 
 
 
One study suggests that Canada’s household credit to GDP (total claims of deposit money 
banks on households as a ratio to GDP), is 89.18, compared with 40.78 in the US and 35.71 
in Japan.16  Even a decade ago, Canada had the highest rate of consumer credit to GDP for 
19 countries.17   
 
At the same time, there is evidence that young adults, recent immigrants, Aboriginal 
Canadians, and low-income and low net-worth households in Canada are struggling to make 
ends meet.18 In many cases, consumer debtors fail in their efforts to meet a heavy debt load 
and they become insolvent. In Canada, the total number of consumer bankruptcies has 
grown in the past 40 years from 6,271 bankruptcies in 1973 to more than 89,000 in 2010.  In 
1980, the insolvency rate for all ages was 1.1 per thousand Canadians; by 2004, that rate 
had quadrupled to 4.0 per thousand Canadians.19 
                                            
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Büyükkarabaca and Valev, supra, note 6, at 1249, data from 1999 to 2007, comparing 37 countries. 
17
 Ronald Mann, “Global Credit Card Use and Debt: Policy Issues and Regulatory Responses”, The 
University of Texas School of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper, April 2005, 
http://ssrn.com/index.html (“Global Credit Card Use”) at 41-2, citing Morgan Stanley study. 
18
 TFFL, supra, note 3 at 14. 
19
 OSB Statistics, (after taxes) http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inbsf-osb.nsf/vwapj/ 
StatsBooklet2006-EN.pdf/$FILE/StatsBooklet2006-EN.pdf. Comparing the Canadian rate of 
bankruptcy to other countries in 2004, the United Kingdom rate was 1.1 per thousand population; 
Australia was 1.8 per thousand; and the United States is 7.0 per thousand population, ibid. Hence, 
while Canada fares better than its neighbour to the south, its rates of individual bankruptcy are much 
higher than the U.K. and Australia. 
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For the 12 month period ending March 31, 2011, there were 132,757 consumer insolvency 
filings, of which 89,332 were bankruptcies and 43,425 were proposals.20 For the first time, 
proposals are a third of all filings, suggesting that debtors have some resources to make a 
proposal to their creditors and that the insolvency may reflect temporary financial distress that 
can be addressed on a going-forward basis if some relief from debt is immediately available. 
As of March 31, 2011, total consumer insolvency filings were down 11.5% from the same 
time last year,21 perhaps reflecting some easing of the worst effects of the 2008-2009 
downturn.  One question is whether changes to consumer lending practices have altered the 
profile of consumer debtors that access the bankruptcy and insolvency system either through 
bankruptcy or proposals under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). 
 
There is a growing psychological and social cognitive literature in respect of consumer credit. 
Generally, the conclusion has been that while access to consumer credit can be welfare-
improving, psychological bias in household finance is such that many consumers over-borrow 
relative to an unbiased benchmark, because of “present-based” preferences;22 over optimism 
regarding capacity to repay;23 and an underestimation of the costs of borrowing.24  
 
Fadel observes that there are powerful psychological and cognitive biases that affect an 
individual’s financial and economic decisions; for example, the so-named “hyperbolic 
discounting” effect, which is the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more 
immediate payoffs rather than later payoffs, which may result in consequences that range 
from not recognizing the cost-cumulative impact of “affordable luxuries”, such as habitual $5 
cups of coffee, to taking on unaffordable mortgage and car payments with even more 
expensive credit-card debt.25 “Hyperbolic discounting” offers an explanation as to why 
individuals acquire substantial credit card debt at high interest rates; studies have illustrated 
how the rewards provided by buying something today with credit tend to outweigh the 
discounted displeasure of future bill statements and repayment of loans.26 
 
The ways in which consumers are accessing credit and making credit decisions has also 
shifted considerably in the past two decades. The life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) of consumption 
assumes that individuals will earn more income as they progress through their working years 
and experience a decline in income at retirement; they will thus borrow when they are young, 
save during middle age, and spend less during retirement.27 Yet consumers are frequently 
                                            
20
 OSB Quarterly Statistics, March 2011, http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br02622.html. 
21
 For the 12 month period ending March 31, 2010 there were 112,227 consumer bankruptcies and 
37,797 proposals. Ibid. 
22
 D. Laibson, “Golden Eggs and Hyberbolic Discounting”, (1997) 112 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 443 at 459-469. 
23
 L. Ausubel, “The Failure of Competition in the Credit Market”, (1991) 81 American Economic 
Review`50 at 55-64; Paige Marta Skiba and Jeremy Tobacman, “Payday Loans, Uncertainty and 
Discounting: Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default”, (2008) Vanderbilt Law and 
Economics Research Paper No 08-33. 
24
 V. Stango and J. Zinman, “Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance”, (2009) 64 Journal of 
Finance 2807. 
25
 Charles Fadel, “Financial Literacy and 21st Century Skills”, (2011) Research paper prepared for the 
Task Force on Financial Literacy, http://www.financialliteracyincanada.com/documents/research-
reports.html, at 7. 
26
 Soman, supra, note 13 at 15, citing C.J. Harris. and David Laibson, “Hyperbolic Discounting and 
Consumption,” (2002), in Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Peter Hansen, and Stephen Turnovsky, eds., 
258–98, Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eighth World Congress, 
Vol. 1.  
27
  Soman, ibid. at 11. See also Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani, “The ‘Life Cycle’ Hypothesis of 
Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests,” (1963) 53 American Economic Review,  55–84; Franco 
Modigliani and Richard Brumberg, “Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An Interpretation 
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subject to cognitive and psychological biases that allow them go into more debt than they 
initially bargained for.28  Soman reports that individuals often fall prey to psychological biases 
that colour their evaluation of various credit options; and individuals frequently lack the 
computation skills necessary to accurately estimate the effect of debt on their future financial 
well-being.29 Psychologically, individuals who are in debt report low levels of happiness and 
well-being.30 Yet, because individuals have high levels of credit card debt but low levels of 
liquid assets, they are unable to smooth out their consumption over their lifetime as predicted 
by the LCH.31  
 
There is also a growing literature, albeit not uncontested, that access to credit should be a 
human right.32 Access to credit is important for low-income individuals and can prevent 
unnecessary liquidation of illiquid investments, such as cashing in all or part of an RRSP.33 
Some empirical research suggests that social networks determine, to some extent, the 
sources of credit, including from “pure conformity” where practice or fad dictates behaviour; 
“instrumental conformity”, where uniformity of products can create access; and “informational 
conformity”, the signalling that occurs when one person communicates the benefits of one 
form of credit, and then lack of, or limited, information propels consumers towards 
conformity.34  It would be interesting to investigate whether such social networks are 
influencing the rise in use of on-line personal loans and payday loans. 
 
There is considerable literature suggesting that access to expensive credit, such as payday 
loans, high interest loans and credit card interest charges, exacerbates financial distress and 
insolvency or bankruptcy filings.35 However, other studies have concluded that expensive 
credit can smooth negative expenditure shocks, such as housing costs or auto repairs; and 
allow short-term management of liquidity to alleviate financial distress.36  
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A 2009 study commissioned by the Bank of Canada on US consumer access to credit found 
a relationship between aggregate consumer spending and credit availability in the United 
States.37 The study noted that, as a result of the financial crisis, banks started to restrict 
access to credit for consumers and businesses, which in turn restrained aggregate demand 
and economic activity. Consumer spending suffered as households were not able to gain 
access to credit in order to finance their expenditures.38 “Credit availability” is measured as 
the willingness of lenders to provide funds at market interest rates, capturing movements in 
credit availability related to non-interest fees, maturity of credit extended, maximum credit 
size, loan covenants, credit score requirements, and collateralization requirements.39 Credit 
availability is an important determinant of consumer spending.40 The study found that 
consumer spending falls in response to a reduction in credit availability, and that large 
changes in credit availability are particularly important for consumers’ spending decisions; 
and these periods tend to be associated with periods of high economic uncertainty. It 
suggests that it may not only be the level of credit availability that matters for consumer 
spending, but also the uncertainty surrounding the availability of credit.41  The study 
concludes that to the extent that policy may influence the credit constraints facing 
households, central banks may be able to undertake credit easing policies geared towards 
affecting credit supply and successfully affect the path of consumer spending.42 
 
One US study found that there is a positive relationship between bank branch presence in 
low-income neighbourhoods and access to mortgage financing, in part because of the 
relationship lending underlying local banks granting home mortgages, and in part because of 
US legislation that requires banks with branches in low to moderate income communities to 
serve the communities’ needs.43 Banks that can interact with the borrower on both sides of 
the balance sheet, i.e. lending and having a record of their deposit, chequing and savings 
history, can learn about a borrower’s quality of financial management over time, such as 
paying utilities and rent, rather than assessing mortgage applications based on a single fixed 
snapshot that is a more traditional measure of credit quality.44  Moreover, the study found that 
such relationships can be more amenable to delivery of services targeted to working class 
people, such as financial literacy, working with community groups to organize pre- and post-
lending education and counselling; “second-chance” chequing accounts; and lower-cost 
alternatives to payday loans.45 
 
This literature resonates when examining recent insolvency filings in Canada, and may 
explain some of the levels of debt when consumers file. 
 
 
IV.   The Profile of Consumer Debtors Accessing the Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
System 
 
Using data collected by the OSB, the study examined causes of insolvency through access to 
a cohort of 4,000 consumer insolvency filings from August 31, 2008 to July 31, 2010, of which 
3,118 were consumer bankruptcies and 882 were consumer proposals.  The data overall 
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 Kimberly Beaton, Credit Constraints and Consumer Spending, Bank of Canada Working Paper 
2009-25, September 2009. 
38
 Ibid. at 3. 
39
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Evidence”, (1997) 40 Journal of Monetary Economics 207-238. 
40
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41
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42
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43
 Ergungor, supra, note 6 at 1322-1323, citing the Community reinvestment Act of 1977. 
44
 Ibid. 
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were analyzed, with particular attention to files where access to credit or related factors were 
declared to be the principal cause of insolvency.   
 
 
1. Causes of Insolvency 
 
What is evident from Tables 1 and 2 below is that “access to credit” forms an extremely small 
percentage of declared reasons for filing bankruptcy or proposals under the BIA, with only 12 
debtors citing this cause as the principal cause. Related causes, such as over-indebtedness 
and insufficient income, are much higher. For bankruptcies, insufficient income accounted for 
30.5% of insolvency, unemployment for 18.8%, over-indebtedness for 12.4%, health for 
12.0%, marriage breakdown for 11.5%, business failure for 7.7%, and debt to the Canada 
Revenue Agency for 2.4%. Access to credit, problems due to the financial crisis, student 
loans and miscellaneous each accounted for less than 2%. 
 
For proposals, insufficient income accounted for 40.7% of insolvency, unemployment for 
15.8%, over-indebtedness for 13.8%, marriage breakdown for 9.3%, health for 8.3%, 
business failure for 4.8%, debt to the Canada Revenue Agency for 2.4% and insolvency due 
to the financial crisis for 2.2%. Access to credit, student loans and miscellaneous each 
accounted for less than 2%. 
 
 
Table 1 Principal Causes of Insolvency, Bankruptcy Files, 3118 sample cohort, 2008-
2010 
 
Cause Number Percentage 
Insufficient Income 951 30.5% 
Over-indebtedness 388 12.4% 
Access to Credit 8 0.3% 
Problems due to 
Financial Crisis 
50 1.6% 
Business Failure 239 7.7% 
Marriage Breakdown 358 11.5% 
Health 374 12.0% 
Debt to CRA 74 2.4% 
Loss of employment 587 18.8% 
Student Loans 36 1.2% 
Miscellaneous 53 1.7% 
TOTAL 3118 100.0% 
 
 
 
Table 2 Principal Causes of Insolvency, Proposal Files, 882 sample cohort, 2008-2010 
 
Cause Number Percentage 
Insufficient Income 359 40.7% 
Over indebtedness 122 13.8% 
Access to Credit 4 0.5% 
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Cause Number Percentage 
Problems due to 
Financial Crisis 
19 2.2% 
Business Failure 42 4.8% 
Marriage Breakdown 82 9.3% 
Health 73 8.3% 
Debt to CRA 21 2.4% 
Loss of employment 139 15.8% 
Student Loans 8 0.9% 
Miscellaneous 13 1.5% 
TOTAL 882 100.0% 
 
 
 
2. Assets and Liabilities 
 
For the data set of 4,000 files, the median assets were $7,275, whereas the median debt was 
$46,930, remarkably close to the per capita debt figure reported for all Canadians.46  Table 3 
and the graphs that follow illustrate that both the average debt and the median debt are many 
times the assets of debtors at the time of filing.  For bankrupts, average assets were $50,177, 
but the median of assets was only $6,105, compared with average debts of $104,307 and a 
median debt of $44,942. Thus, bankrupts had seven times more debt than assets.  
 
For debtors filing proposals, the average assets were $104,561 and the median was $18,353; 
whereas the average debt was $135,257 and the median debt $58,801. Hence for proposals, 
there was a group of insolvent consumer debtors with high assets and high debts, which 
skewed the average upward, and the median figure becomes more meaningful for 
understanding the asset/debt ratio for the entire cohort.  The figures illustrate that there are 
several times more assets to try to protect through a proposal than assets held by debtors 
who filed for bankruptcy. However, even with greater assets, the median of liabilities owed at 
the time of filing were three times the assets of debtors. 
 
 
Table 3 Mean and Median Assets and Liabilities for 4,000 Consumer Insolvency 
Filings, 2008-2010 
 
 
Assets – 
Mean 
Assets - 
Median 
Liabilities - 
Mean 
Liabilities -
Median 
Entire 
Cohort $62,247.48 $7,275.00 $111,218.50 $46,930.00 
Bankruptcies $50,176.54 $6,104.50 $104,306.59 $44,942.00 
Proposals $104,560.78 $18,353.00 $135,257.44 $58,801.00 
 
 
                                            
46
 See Statscan figures reported at note 13. 
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Graph 2 Consumer insolvency files, mean and median assets and liabilities, 4,000 files  
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Graph 3 Mean and median assets and liabilities, Bankruptcies, 3118 files 
 
$0.00
$20,000.00
$40,000.00
$60,000.00
$80,000.00
$100,000.00
$120,000.00
Assets Liabilities
Consumer Bankruptcies
Mean
Median
  
 
 
 
 15
Graph 4 Mean and median assets and liabilities, Proposals, 882 files 
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3. Type of Debt 
 
The full data set also generated information on the sources of debt, with mortgage debt, 
credit card debt and personal loans comprising the largest source of financial pressure. The 
type of debt that insolvent consumer debtors have is significant, given the above 
observations regarding the direct and indirect costs of expensive debt.  For all files in the 
cohort, the amount of credit card debt was significant, a median of $10,800 for credit cards 
from bank and trust companies and a further almost $6,000 from other credit cards.47 For the 
bankruptcy files, the median was $10,396 for credit cards from bank and trust companies and 
a further $5,700 from other credit cards. For all proposals, the amount of credit card debt was 
significant, a median of $11,700 for credit cards from bank and trust companies and at further 
almost $6,700 from other credit cards. 
 
Overall, the median debt for bankrupts was $44,492 and the median debt for debtors making 
proposals was $63,663. Mortgages are the largest debt that consumer debtors hold, which is 
not particularly surprising, but only 1097 (27%) of the 4,000 filers had houses, condominium 
apartments, co-operative housing or other forms of ownership in their housing 
accommodation (“homes”), of which 90% of these debtors had mortgages.  Of that group, 
only 24% of bankrupts owned a home and of those bankrupts, 87% had a mortgage; so the 
figures below in Table 4 represent 652 debtors with mortgages.  For proposal debtors, 39% 
had homes, of which 98% had mortgages, thus the mean and median mortgage figures 
below represent 336 proposal debtors. What is also significant is the amount of personal 
bank loans and finance companies loans that consumers hold in addition to credit card debt, 
as illustrated in Table 4.   
 
 
                                            
47
 The OSB form collects these different types by these categories. 
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Table 4 Mean and Median Debt by Type, 4,000 Insolvency Filings 
 
All Insolvencies 
     
 Mortgages Bank Loans 
Finance 
Company Loans 
Bank/Trust 
Credit Cards 
Other Credit 
Cards 
Mean  $182,253.15 $24,633.81 $14,754.60 $17,120.81 $9,992.92 
Median $157,000.00 $13,846.19 $8,842.00 $10,800.00 $6,000.00 
Number 988 2403 1650 3105 2471 
      
Bankruptcies 
     
 Mortgages Bank Loans 
Finance 
Company Loans 
Bank/Trust 
Credit Cards 
Other Credit 
Cards 
Mean  $167,550.80 $25,881.31 $15,866.47 $16,581.88 $9,717.84 
Median $141,000.00 $13,392.50 $9,000.00 $10,396.00 $5,699.63 
Number 652 1844 1264 2394 1880 
      
Proposals 
     
 Mortgages Bank Loans 
Finance 
Company Loans 
Bank/Trust 
Credit Cards 
Other Credit 
Cards 
Mean  $210,782.71 $20,518.62 $11,113.67 $18,935.42 $10,867.95 
Median $187,500.00 $15,000.00 $8,580.50 $11,700.00 $6,700.00 
Number 336 559 386 711 591 
 
 
These figures are illustrated in Graphs 5 to 7 below. 
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Graph 5 
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Removing mortgages from the graphs and combining the two categories of credit card debt, 
the amount of non-mortgage debt carried by insolvent debtors becomes clearer.  For all files 
in the 4,000 cohort, the average credit card debt is $21,620 and the median debt is $13,979. 
90% of all debtors filing had credit card debt.  For bankruptcies, the average credit card debt 
was $20,739 and the median was $13,021. 90% of bankrupts had credit card debt.  For 
proposals, the average credit card debt was considerably lower, $7,969, with the median 
amount of credit card debt being $3,924. 91% of proposal debtors had credit card debt. 
These amounts are illustrated by Graphs 8 to 10 below. 
 
 
 
 19
Graph 8 
$0.00
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$15,000.00
$20,000.00
$25,000.00
Bank Loans Finance Company Loans Credit Cards
Debt Type
Liabilities by Debt Type for All Insolvencies
Mean 
Median
 
 
 
Graph 9 
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          Graph 10 
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4. Assets and Liabilities for Selected Causes of Insolvency 
 
The study also examined assets and liabilities in cases in which the principal cause of 
insolvency was reported as lack of access to credit, as well as examining what appeared to 
be the most related causes, insufficient income, over-indebtedness and problems due to the 
financial crisis.  In terms of debtors reporting that the cause was lack of access to credit (a 
very small number), they had one third fewer median assets but a comparable level of debt 
compared with all files in the bankruptcy cohort.  Where insufficient income was cited as the 
principal cause, there were slightly lower median assets and considerably less debt than for 
all bankruptcies.   
 
Where the financial crisis was cited as the primary cause, the median assets at the time of 
filing for bankruptcy were almost three times the overall median at $17,401, and the median 
liabilities were significant, $141,502.  In this group were some debtors with very significant 
debt; and if the debtors with liabilities of greater than $500,000 are removed, the median 
drops to $124,903, still significantly higher than for all files. The amount of debt in this group 
may support some of the observations by credit professionals, discussed below, that a 
number of consumer debtors were living far beyond their means, and it was an economic 
shock associated with the financial crisis that tipped the balance into insolvency.  
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Table 5 Assets and Liabilities, Bankruptcies, selected causes of insolvency 
 
 
Liabilities – 
Mean 
Liabilities – 
Median 
Assets - 
Mean 
Assets – 
Median 
All Files $104,307 $44,942 $50,177 $6,105 
 
Access to 
Credit $84,961 $43,907 $58,068 $3,827 
Insufficient 
Income $73,800 $37,682 $37,651 $5,301 
Over-
indebtedness $94,617 $44,780 $55,115 $7,150 
Problems 
due to 
Financial 
Crisis $206,004 $141,502 $118,525 $17,401 
 
 
 
Graph 11 
 
 
 
 
Turning to the data in the cohort of 882 proposal files, only 4 debtors reported that access to 
credit was a primary cause of insolvency, and this very small number had considerably fewer 
assets and about half the debt.  For the almost 14% that cited over-indebtedness as the 
cause, asset levels were higher than the overall median and the amount of debt was 
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considerable higher, with a median of $63,663.  For the 41% of proposal debtors that 
reported that insufficient income was the primary cause of insolvency, median assets were 
$15,201 and median debt was $49,242, both lower than the overall figures.  Finally, for the 19 
debtors (2.2%) that reported that insolvency was due to the financial crisis, their assets and 
debts were much higher than any other category, with median assets of $244,500 and 
median debt of $257,745.  
 
 
Table 6 Assets and Liabilities, Proposals, selected causes of insolvency 
 
 
Liabilities – 
Mean 
Liabilities – 
Median 
Assets - 
Mean 
Assets – 
Median 
 
All Files 
 $135,653 $59,228 $104,920 $18,552 
 
Access to 
Credit $40,157 $27,845 $59, 275 $5,750 
Insufficient 
Income $132,146 $49,242 $98,065 $15,201 
Over-
indebtedness $119,216 $63,663 $95,930 $21,130 
Problems due 
to Financial 
Crisis $303,272 $257,745 $253,498 $244,500 
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The data overall illustrate significant debt in relation to assets, no matter the cohort, a factor 
that insolvency legislation in Canada is aimed at assisting to remedy by providing 
mechanisms that offer consumer debtors a “fresh start”.  The data provides the backdrop for 
the next discussion, the degree to which access to credit and the cost of credit play a role in 
consumer insolvency. 
 
 
V.  Access to Consumer Credit Before and After the Global Financial Crisis 
 
This part discusses various ways in which access to credit appears to have been an issue 
before and after the financial crisis. It is based on the interviews with the 55 credit 
counsellors, bank managers and credit union managers (“credit professionals”), further 
analysis of a subset of the 4,000 consumer insolvency files, and the extant literature. Banking 
practices with respect to consumer and household access to credit have shifted over the 
years, including access to mortgages, lines of credit and loans, and the shift away from 
traditional deposit-taking banks to alternative forms of credit. 
 
1. Consumer Access to Mortgage Debt 
 
In Canada, the largest purchase most consumers make in their lifetime is a house, 
condominium or co-op apartment, almost always by taking one or more mortgages. Access to 
credit in this respect is critically important, as it allows individuals some security in their 
housing situation. Access to mortgage debt requires the appropriate evaluation of the 
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property and house/condominium covered, as well as an assessment of the capacity of the 
consumer borrower to carry the expected costs of the mortgage.  
 
Considering the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption, discussed above, mortgage debt is to 
be acquired earlier in adults’ credit history, often moving from “starter” homes to more 
permanent homes, and the mortgage debt retired during middle age. Bank and credit union 
managers observed that this pattern was the norm for many years. However, the pattern has 
shifted. In 2009, 34% of retired individuals aged 55 and over, whether single or in a couple, 
held mortgage or consumer debt. The median amount owed by these individuals 
was $19,000.48 The incidence of mortgage debt was much higher among consumers in the 
same age group who had not yet retired; among pre-retirees aged 55 and over, two-thirds 
held mortgage or consumer debt and their median debt load was $40,000, double that of 
retirees.49  What that means is that for the majority of people over age 55, resources that 
should otherwise be directed to savings pre-retirement, are being used instead to pay 
mortgages. 
 
In the US, the sub-prime mortgage debacle revealed the problems of inappropriate granting 
of mortgage credit. The issues surrounding the sub-prime meltdown are many, including the 
economic incentive structure that allowed increased granting of access to mortgages where 
there was no realistic expectation they would be repaid;50 the steering of particular classes 
and races of people into sub-prime mortgages when they would have qualified for regular 
mortgages under less onerous terms;51 and the negative externalities created when 
originating lenders could shed the risk of the debt immediately through securitization and 
derivatives.  Given that the sub-prime issue was not generally an issue for Canadian 
consumer debtors, this article does not discuss these issues, other than to observe that 
defaults of sub-prime mortgages resulted in some large financial institutions facing direct or 
indirect exposures to complex structured products, which in turn influenced their lending 
patterns. However, in Canada, we face a different set of issues relating to consumer access 
to mortgage debt, which appears to have been exacerbated by the financial crisis.  
 
Many Canadian mortgages are granted based on a traditional formula of 20-per-cent down 
payment on the mortgage, implying a loan-to-value ratio of 80 per cent. However, Soman 
observes that short-term low interest and long-term high interest is especially popular for 
interest-only loans that have various payment options and adjustable-rate mortgages, which 
allows for zero or even negative amortization during the introductory low-interest rates. He 
notes that these types of mortgages are problematic for individuals who steeply discount 
future events, as they are over-optimistic about more funds available in the future or they 
focus on short-term rewards at the expense of long-term costs.52 Soman suggests that these 
consumers underestimate the total cost of a deferred-cost mortgage and enter into contracts 
that lock them into a high interest rate that they are unable to pay.53  
 
The interviews with the bank managers and credit union managers across Canada were 
particularly helpful in identifying issues in respect of access to mortgage credit. In the several 
years prior to the financial crisis, there were individuals who bought their first home by 100% 
financing; they had good credit, so they took cash advances on their credit cards and used 
                                            
48
 StatsCan, Retiring with Debt, April 2011, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-
quotidien/110427/dq110427b-eng.htm. 
49
 Ibid. 
50
 Where risk of the original lender was shed because the loan was immediately securitized, thus 
incentives at the front end were to grant the credit without proper scrutiny of ability to repay. 
51
 Cheryl Wade, “Subprime Mortgages and Corporate Governance on Wall Street: Monitoring 
Compliance with the U.S. Fair Housing Act”, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2009 (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2010). 
52
 Soman supra, note 13 at 16. 
53
 Ibid. 
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that as a down payment and then financed the remaining 95% through one or more 
mortgages. In such circumstances, servicing the mortgage has often meant that everything 
else goes on credit cards, which can create the conditions for mortgage default.   
 
The experience both prior to and after the financial crisis has been that, typically, mortgages 
are the last loans that people default on. Consumers recognize that their house/condo is an 
asset, so they pay that bill.  However, the managers surveyed indicated that across Canada, 
with the exception of Saskatchewan, there has been a moderate to large increase in defaults 
on mortgage payments since 2008. There has also been substantial increase in consumer 
debtors seeking forbearance agreements or to remortgage where individuals can no longer 
service the monthly payments.  In Alberta, there has been a significant increase in the 
number of defaults in mortgages; and financial institutions that previously shied away from 
foreclosures are starting the process as soon as two payments are missed. There has been a 
considerable rise in the Maritimes in default rates on mortgages since October 2008, often 
due to insolvency. One credit union in Halifax reported that the default rate on mortgages and 
personal loans in 2010 was the highest percentage in its history; yet another observed that 
the increase was primarily on the business loan side, rather than mortgage default, 
particularly where the business had been struggling prior to the financial crisis. Several major 
banks reported that they have tightened lending policy to adhere to government regulations in 
regard to home purchases, moving to shorter amortizations and higher down payments.  
 
In Saskatchewan, the foreclosure rate has been stable since 2004, with one manager noting 
that housing expenses and mortgages are not usually where consumers default. The stability 
is attributed to the activities of the Saskatchewan Provincial Mediation Board. Financial 
Institutions that intend to foreclose on a mortgage must give notice to the Board, which has 
thirty days to inform the property owner about the foreclosure process and to endeavor to 
assist the owner and the financial institution to find a mutually satisfactory arrangement for 
payment of the arrears. If no arrangement is made, the financial institution can commence 
foreclosure proceedings.54 The Board encourages parties to find a mutually acceptable 
arrangement for the payment of arrears, including payment of arrears, sale of the property, 
quit claim the property and turn it over to the lender, and other action that is within the 
financial means of the borrower.55 
 
One issue identified is the cost of access to mortgage credit through non-bank mortgage 
brokers. In many cases of home purchases, there are multiple brokers that can get 
mortgages for clients without them going through credit checks and income verification that 
banks would ask for; consumers can get often get whatever amount they want. However, it is 
not in the best interests of the consumer to purchase a home that he or she cannot sustain 
the payments for. A number of credit professionals suggested that there should be more 
responsibility on brokers to examine the consumer’s credit background and a duty to know 
their client before putting together the mortgage deal. Rates are higher with private lenders, 
and brokers and consumers may go to these private lenders because they do not qualify 
through the bank. However, frequently the consumer debtor ends up in financial difficulty and 
the broker arranging the deal has long exited the picture.   
 
One recommendation is that there should be more integrity in full and truthful disclosure of 
the full costs of the mortgage to the consumer and full disclosure of the credit capacity of 
mortgage applicants. Mortgage brokers often do not provide full disclosure, which in turn 
impedes the ability of lenders to make the proper decision, particularly where the consumer is 
dealing with the broker rather than the financial institution directly. 
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 Government of Saskatchewan, “Provincial Mediation Board,” http://www.justice.gov.sk.ca/PMB. 
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 Government of Saskatchewan, “Information about Mortgage Foreclosure Notices,” 
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One interviewee noted that government has partially addressed this issue through decreased 
amortization of mortgages and qualification requirements for fixed rate term, but observed 
that housing corporations that are primary insurers of high ratio mortgages are not sufficiently 
concerned about high ratio mortgages because the risk is borne by CMHC, which provides 
insurance. Similarly, there were several complaints that the federal government development 
banks and Farm Credit Canada are supposed to be complementary lenders, in some 
instances to provide financing where a bank or credit union declines the loan; but rather, they 
are becoming competition for local lenders. Interviewees viewed these changes as unfair 
competition because the resources of the Crown are backing the loans. New rules applicable 
to government-backed insured mortgages reduce the maximum amortization period to 30 
years from 35 years for new government-backed insured mortgages with loan-to-value ratios 
of more than 80 per cent. Second, they reduce the amount one can borrow in refinancing 
mortgages from 90% to 85% of the home’s value. Both changes came into force on March 
18, 2011. The government also withdrew government insurance backing of home equity lines 
of credit, in force on April 18, 2011.56 
 
A number of credit counsellors observed that when housing prices dropped, individuals were 
not able to shed mortgage debt by selling the home and scaling down. One counsellor 
observed that there is likely to be another major rise in defaults once the Bank of Canada 
prime lending rate normalizes to the 5-6% range, given that a large portion of home owners 
are on a floating rate or on a fixed rate that will mature in 1-2 years, and they will be 
experiencing a much higher rate/payment in their housing costs.   
 
Across Canada, there appears to be increasing consolidation of debt into mortgages. 
Consolidation loans can often create the conditions for mortgage default. Individuals are 
defaulting on their mortgages because they have already taken the equity out of the house or 
business and when their finances started to feel tight with income reduction due to job loss, 
reduced hours of employment or illness, there was no longer an equity cushion in their 
home.  
 
Finally, it is important to note that many consumer debtors that file for bankruptcy do not have 
houses or apartments in which they have any equity that might serve as a financial cushion.  
In some cases, rents have become prohibitively high and the existence of other debts means 
that the consumer debtors cannot afford the rent.  There are some programs that aid, such as 
Ontario’s “rent bank”, which as of 2004,  provided $4 to 5 million a year across Ontario to 
provide interest-free loans to single parent families for rental arrears. Such programs are 
incredibly important alternatives to incurring expensive debt and should be encouraged 
across Canada. 
 
 
2. Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOC) 
 
Banks report having tightened their lending since October 2008, especially in regard to 
consolidation loans. Prior to the financial crisis, a significant consolidation and access to 
credit strategy was a home equity line of credit (HELOC).  
 
A HELOC is where the lender agrees to lend a maximum amount within an agreed period, 
where the collateral is the consumer borrower's equity in his or her house.  The lines of credit 
were originally conceptualized for use for major expenses, such as post-secondary 
education, home improvements, or medical bills, and not for day-to-day expenses.  A HELOC 
                                            
56
 Department of Finance Canada, News Release, 2011-003, “The Harper Government Takes Prudent 
Action to Support the Long-Term Stability of Canada’s Housing Market” (17 January 2011), 
Department of Finance http://www.fin.gc.ca/. See also Canada, Department of Finance, Backgrounder 
- Supporting the Long-Term Stability of Canada’s Housing Market, (2011), Department of Finance 
http://www.fin.gc.ca. 
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differs from a conventional home equity loan in that the full amount of the loan agreed on is 
not advanced immediately; rather, the borrower uses a line of credit to borrow amounts up to 
a credit limit each year. The interest rate on an equity line is variable and may change 
quarterly, based on the prime rate. HELOC funds can be borrowed during the draw period, 
typically from 5 to 25 years.57 A HELOC may have a minimum monthly payment requirement, 
frequently only the interest.58 The full principal amount is due at the end of the draw period, 
either as a lump-sum payment or as per an amortization schedule.  
 
However, HELOC were used as access to credit for purposes not originally intended. When 
consumers reached the limits on their credit cards, they resorted to HELOC, and in turn, ran 
credit card debt up again, placing their mortgages at risk of foreclosure. During the housing 
boom, the value of homes skyrocketed and the requirements to obtain a HELOC relaxed 
significantly.59 Consumer debtors have paid off credit cards with equity in their homes during 
the boom and have no equity left and have more credit card debt again.  Spending equity 
in people’s homes has become, in the words of one credit counsellor “a frightening 
epidemic”. When the value in homes decreased, consumer debtors’ ability to continually 
spend via the HELOC declined or stopped. Now, the debt servicing ratios have been lowered 
and income confirmation, especially for the self-employed, is required before HELOC are 
granted in many cases. 
 
The trend to use home equity lines of credit to finance day to day consumer expenses can be 
contrasted with studies that suggest that consumers’ retirement years will be secure as they 
can rely on their home equity as one retirement strategy.60 As Canada shifts from a system 
where pension savings were secure as consumers could not access their savings in a 
registered pension plan, a study commissioned for the federal Research Working Group on 
Retirement Income Adequacy suggested seniors can rely on their home equity as the 
cushion. The report noted that with the sharp decline in stock market values in the fall of 
2008, Canadians found that their retirement wealth was adversely affected, especially those 
who had already or were about to retire. Several defined benefit plans became insolvent as 
they no longer had sufficient assets to cover their pension liabilities. 61 The report observed 
that Canadians have significant savings in owner-occupied housing and that they can access 
their savings by downsizing their housing or taking on a reverse-mortgage during retirement 
years. 62  However, the growth in HELOC could render that option meaningless, which is a 
problem that will manifest itself as the population continues to age. 
 
 
3. The Link between Employment, Income, and Capacity to Manage Debt 
 
For the most part, steady employment has been a big factor in both access to credit and 
capacity to manage debt. The decline in employment during the financial crisis was 
significant. The Bank of Canada reported 400,000 lost jobs during the height of the crisis.  
There were layoffs, permanent job losses, reduction of hours and failed businesses. 
Employment loss or reduction of income created significant problems for payment of 
mortgages and other ongoing payment obligations.  
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 Ibid. at 5, 7. 
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 Ibid. at 5, 7. 
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The linkage between default rates and loss of employment is very strong, in the view of 
almost all the credit professionals interviewed across Canada. Since the financial crisis, the 
number of middle-class families and individuals who are having difficulties because of 
employment loss and income reductions has meant that default rates have permeated into 
that tier. Bank and credit union managers witnessed many more working class and middle 
class individuals seeking to renegotiate terms and conditions of repayment based on their 
loss of income.  A number of regions, such as the Maritimes, saw defaults due to job losses 
in particular sectors, along with concurrent insolvency filings. For example, in one community 
with a significant fishery sector, people depended heavily on the US market for lobsters and 
that market collapsed with the US economy collapse, in turn tightening credit availability in 
the local community in Canada. Credit managers reported a serious rise in loan defaults in 
areas with lower incomes and jobs overall. 
 
The changes in access to credit have varied, depending on region and sector of the economy 
hit by recession. Initially, in 2009, Ontario was dramatically affected, and rapidly rising 
unemployment made it very difficult to get credit. In particular, anyone who worked in the auto 
industry or related industries was unlikely to get credit on economical basis, one credit 
professional observing that 5-7 spin-off jobs are lost for every one job lost in the auto 
industry. The key with high unemployment is that the consumer’s debt/income ratio changes.  
More recently, credit counsellors are seeing a spike in consumer defaults in Alberta, where 
consumer debtors are suffering the effects of lost employment. There has been a dramatic 
decline in government jobs in a number of provinces, and according to a number of 
interviewees, the global financial crisis also resulted in halt of hundreds of construction jobs 
and manufacturing jobs related to export products to the US, again causing considerable 
financial hardship for consumers in those sectors to access credit. 
 
Even if an individual is able to secure new employment relatively easily after a job loss due to 
economic downturn, access to credit is a problem. Since many people have not been at their 
new jobs for very long, they are being declined credit because it is not viewed as a stable 
employment history. For example, contract employment for one year is not considered by 
most lending institutions to be steady employment and people will not be offered credit. Yet 
they need the credit to get back on their feet financially. 
 
Graph 13 below illustrates some of the connection between income and financial distress.  Of 
the 3118 bankruptcy files, both the mean and median income of the bankrupt were $20,000 
or less.63 Including the total family income of the bankrupts filing in income amounts, those 
figures were $25,602 and $23,754 respectively.  For the few bankrupts that cited access to 
credit as the principal cause of insolvency, the median income was $20,014.64 For bankrupts 
whose primary declared cause of insolvency was insufficient income, the median income was 
$19,944; and including total family income, the median was $23,400.65 Where over-
indebtedness was the principal cause of insolvency, the bankrupts’ median income was 
$20,164, with the family median income of $26,400.66  Where the declared cause was that 
bankruptcy was precipitated by the financial crisis, that median income was $19,200 for the 
bankrupt’s income and $29,572 for family income. 
 
The figures suggest that low income is a major contributing factor to insolvency in all files. 
Across these arguably related causes, access to credit, insufficient income and over-
indebtedness, bankrupts have little or no cushion for any kind of economic shock, given that 
individual and family incomes are so low. Interestingly, where the financial crisis was 
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identified as a cause, consumer debtors filing have higher income levels, as illustrated by the 
graph.                      
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Proposals tell a slightly different story, as illustrated by Graph 11 below.  There are generally 
higher levels of income that may be available to make a proposal viable. For the entire 
cohort, the median income of the insolvent debtor was $28,668 and the median family 
income $36,000.67 For those debtors declaring access to credit a problem, the median 
insolvent debtor and family income are still low, $18,948 and $28,488 respectively.68 For 
insufficient income, over-indebtedness and problems due to the financial crisis, median 
income levels are higher than those for bankruptcies, all between $27,600 and $29,000, the 
average income between $30,000 and $32,000.   For insufficient income and over-
indebtedness, the median family income levels were approximately $36,0000 and the 
average (mean) between $38,500 and $40,300. For proposal debtors that identified the 
financial crisis as a principal cause of insolvency, median family income was $52,104, 
suggesting that the crisis has pushed families with higher income into insolvency.  
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 The mean (average) income of the debtor making the proposal was $18,124 and the mean family 
income was $34,723. 
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Hence, for proposals, income levels are generally higher than bankruptcies, and thus debtors 
do have some availability of surplus income to be able to make a proposal to their creditors. 
Thus while the levels of liabilities are considerably higher, the availability of income combined 
with the desire to protect a higher level of assets means that consumer debtors are making 
proposals.  The increase in the number of proposals overall in relation to bankruptcies, 
discussed above, may also be illustrative of this growing group of consumer debtors who had 
little to financially cushion themselves during the recent economic uncertainty, yet have the 
income to avoid bankruptcy.  It is evident from the graph above that for many debtors, their 
income is the bulk of the family income, other than for the very few files where the financial 
crisis was cited as a cause.   
 
Most of the credit professionals interviewed observed that after job losses since October 
2008 and inability to replace the job with another, many individuals have opened small 
businesses and sole proprietorships. While they are trying to put their skills to good use, often 
there is not a market for their services or they are not able to manage their finances, and they 
are shouldering expensive debt associated with start-up costs because they cannot get lower 
priced bank and credit union loans.  Credit professionals observed that small businesses 
usually must have two years of business financials before they can even apply for credit. 
Unfortunately, the first two years is when debtors need the funds to stay in business, hence 
they turn to credit card and other expensive debt to finance start up costs. These consumers 
usually try to personally guarantee any money borrowed from more traditional lenders; 
however, as these consumers are considered self employed, they do not meet the strict 
guidelines for employment confirmation.  
 
Small business credibility is based on personal credit, and establishing such credibility to 
lenders, which has increased in difficulty because of job shortages. Since it is based on 
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personal credit, it increases the difficulty of the new business getting credit. Because of the 
prior loss of a job, the debtor has also lost his or her credit rating, again making self-
employment credit more difficult to access.  Where they are able to secure financing, the 
personal guarantees that individuals have given are being called on, resulting in default and 
foreclosure when the business fails, increasing bankruptcies post the financial crisis.  
 
With the financial crisis, certain businesses were affected more than others.  One manager in 
PEI observed that its bank had adopted a retail adjudication model for small business lending 
ten years ago, so that if the client has up to a certain amount in sales and has good credit, 
then the bank looks at whether they paid personal bills on time, etc.  However, a number of 
bank managers observed that because of the crisis, they are far more attentive to 
fundamentals regarding business loans and less on relationships, which results in less 
access to credit for many individuals. 
 
Table 7 and Graphs 15 and 16 below relate to income, assets and liabilities for debtors that 
reported loss of employment as their principal reason for filing a bankruptcy or proposal.  For 
bankruptcies where loss of employment was the principal cause of insolvency, bankrupts had 
lower median assets and liabilities, but the loss of employment likely precipitated the 
insolvency. Here again, one can observe that the bankrupt is responsible for the bulk of 
family income and thus job loss can be particularly problematic for carrying the family’s 
existing debt load.  For proposals where the principal cause of insolvency was reported to be 
loss of employment, both assets and liabilities were lower than for all proposals, yet 
considerably higher than bankrupts had, and there was more income that was available to 
make payments under a proposal. 
 
 
Table 7 Assets, Liabilities and Income for Consumer Debtors Filing because of Loss of 
Employment, 726 files 
 
 
Liabilities - 
Mean 
Liabilities – 
Median Assets - Mean 
Assets – 
Median 
All 
Bankruptcies 104,307 44,942 50,177 6,105 
Bankruptcies – 
Employment 76,920 37,200 38,642 5,700 
All Proposals 135,653 59,228 104,920 18,552 
Proposals – 
Employment 112,064 47,729 88,121 13,500 
     
 
Family Income 
- Mean 
Family Income – 
Median 
Insolvent's 
Income - Mean 
Insolvent's 
Income – 
Median 
All 
Bankruptcies 25,602 23,754 20,233 19,644 
Bankruptcies – 
Employment 22,591 21,120 16,846 18,000 
All Proposals 38,803 36,000 29,997 28,668 
Proposals – 
Employment 35,493 35,736 25,651 24,125 
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Graph 15 
 
 
 
 
Graph 16 Assets and Liabilities, bankruptcies and proposals, insolvency due to unemployment 
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Graph 17 Annual Income, bankruptcies and proposals, Insolvency due to Unemployment 
 
 
 
 
 
Credit counselling services are often not able to help people with small businesses, as they 
cannot place business debt on their programs unless the business is closed officially with 
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA).  Credit counselling debt repayment programs are often 48 
months, but one credit counsellor observed that the amount of debt has increased and 
people need to be on a Orderly Payment of Debt (OPD) program for 60 months most often; 
and their level of debt is so high that they cannot qualify for their program to payoff in 48 
months.69 
 
 
4. The Link Between Credit Card Debt and Consumer Access to Credit  
 
In Canada, there is increasing understanding of the relationship between credit card debt and 
insolvency, but little work has been done in understanding the prior relationship between 
credit cards and access to credit. Credit cards bring important efficiencies to commercial 
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exchange.70 Equally, however, they can create access to very expensive credit, which 
consumers may not appreciate can prejudice their longer term financial viability. 
 
Ronald Mann has undertaken considerable empirical research in the United States and other 
countries analyzing these linkages.71 His work examines the effect of credit card borrowing. 
He found that credit card spending relates to subsequent growth in consumer credit and that 
the growth in credit card debt related to a subsequent growth in US consumer bankruptcy 
filings.72 On the positive side, credit cards can assist with bridge financing when a family is 
experiencing interruption in income, in that if they have loss of employment, they are unlikely 
to get a conventional loan. Mann suggests that high credit card borrowing might reflect use of 
credit cards to meet crisis-level expenses to ease the short-term financial pressure faced by a 
family, and hence may be a useful short-term financing tool.73 Mann has situated the rise of 
credit cards in the general shift from paper-based to electronic payments.74  He observes that 
the plastic card, to the extent that it has facilitated entrepreneurial activity and consumer 
borrowing, has been an important component of a modern economy, but that there are social 
costs associated with credit cards, in the form of financial distress.75 He observes that 
excessive credit card debt can impose substantial costs on the debtor, family members and 
the general welfare safety net; as well as cost consequences from the diminished productive 
activities of those individuals in financial distress.76  
 
However, there can be problems where consumers did not intend to use credit cards as a 
borrowing mechanism, or where they spend more than they would otherwise and acquire 
unanticipated debt.77 In the effort to meet fixed debt commitments, such as mortgage and 
utilities payments, consumers often rely on credit cards to bridge expenses, without fully 
appreciating the real costs of carrying that debt. Retail stores have added to the proliferation 
of credit cards, and while they assist with access to credit in the short term, it is often difficult 
to maintain payments on multiple cards, in turn impairing the consumer’s credit rating.  By the 
time the consumer approaches a bank or credit union for assistance, the credit is already 
seriously impaired and difficult to fix.  As one credit professional observed, early in the life of 
credit cards, paying the minimum payment would pay the balance off in 18 months; now, if a 
consumer pays a minimum payment on $2000, it would take 36 years to pay off.  The 
majority of credit professionals interviewed suggested that credit card interest rates and fees 
should be brought more in line with personal loans, including minimum payments that really 
do assist in reducing the debt load.  
 
Buckland reports that sub-prime credit cards have proliferated in Canada, charging fees and 
interest combined into an Annual Percentage Rate (APR) that is ‘substandard,’ referring to an 
interest rate higher than what is charged by regular credit cards, often targeted at consumers 
with a poor or no credit history.78  Here again, there is a segment of the population that is 
able to access credit card debt, but these consumer debtors are paying considerably more 
than the already high fees and interest charged by credit card companies to the general 
population. 
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Consumers that routinely use credit cards have poor memory of their past expenses, 
underestimate these expenses, and consequently overspend believing they have more 
liquidity at their disposal than they do.79 Payment by credit card results in a disassociation 
between consumption and payment, known as “transaction decoupling” so that payment 
costs and consumption benefits become uncoupled from one another, effectively 
anaesthetizing individuals from being exposed to the psychological pain of paying.80 Soman 
has argued that unlike cash payments where the payment is made at the time of purchase, 
with credit card payments, the consumer does not have to pay until a month later, when the 
bill comes, factors that make it harder for consumers to maintain self-control and easier for 
them to spend using credit cards.81 
 
There are also a number of contracting issues involved in credit card debt, including, 
standard form contracts that are often incomprehensible to cardholders; unilateral rights to 
amend terms of agreements; and financial terms such as annual percentage calculations and 
default provisions that are not accessible to the lay credit card holder.82  These difficulties are 
exacerbated by the fact that the cardholders may have a number of credit cards, all with 
varying payment terms and conditions.83 Oren Bar-Gill’s research suggests that credit card 
products are systematically designed to take advantage of common cognitive defects that 
limit the ability of typical consumers to accurately price the cost of credit, such as offering 
teaser rates where people do not study closely the longer-term interest rates or outcomes 
relating to missed payments.84  
 
Mann and Bar-Gill’s observations are borne out by the experiences of the 55 credit 
counsellors and credit managers interviewed for this study. Some companies have increased 
interest rates on credit cards for no discernable reason, and are demanding higher payments, 
which are proving problematic for getting ahead of the monthly minimum payments. A 
number of bank managers suggested that creditors are monitoring their delinquency more 
closely, and are increasing rates on credit card debt if payments are late or missed, which 
does not help the consumer and just increases the profitability for the creditor’s bottom line. 
 
Numerous credit professionals suggested that credit card companies should not be able to 
randomly increase a consumer’s credit limit. The consumer should update financial 
information to ensure he or she qualifies. Given both financial literacy issues and behavioural 
norms, automatic increases in limits encourage debt spending instead of forcing consumers 
to examine their budget practices. The government has responded to this concern. Effective 
January 1, 2010, the Credit Business Practices Regulations contain a number of changes 
that are intended to increase transparency and protect consumers.85  There are new 
regulations applying to multiple types of lenders regarding credit cards and credit contracts: 
the Regulations Amending the Cost of Borrowing (Banks) Regulations,86 Regulations 
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Amending the Cost of Borrowing (Authorized Foreign Banks) Regulations,87 the Regulations 
Amending the Cost of Borrowing (Trust and Loan Companies) Regulations,88 Regulations 
Amending the Cost of Borrowing (Retail Associations) Regulations,89 Regulations Amending 
the Cost of Borrowing (Canadian Insurance Companies) Regulations,90 and Regulations 
Amending the Cost of Borrowing (Foreign Insurance Companies) Regulations.91  
 
Section 6 of each of these amended new regulations addresses increases to credit card 
limits; specifically, an institution may not increase the credit limit on a borrower’s credit card 
account without first obtaining the borrower’s express consent to do so. If the borrower’s 
consent to the increase is given orally, the institution must, by the time of the next statement 
of account, provide confirmation of that consent to the borrower in writing, in paper or 
electronic form.92 The regulation also specifies that the use of any service related to the credit 
card account by the borrower, such as use of the credit card, does not constitute express 
consent.93 The policy rationale for altering the way that credit card limits are increased is to 
“assist consumers to keep track of their financial situation.”94  
 
Another suggestion, not yet adopted, was that there should be a prohibition on a bank or 
credit card company adversely affecting a consumer’s credit score when the consumer has 
requested a lowering of his or her credit card limit. 
 
Also recommended by the credit professionals was that solicitation for credit cards through 
the mail should not be allowed. Approval of credit is based on a scoring system and a 
probability of default. If a consumer is within those parameters, credit card applications are 
mailed via a computer system, increasing access to expensive credit, which is tempting for 
the consumer debtor for all the above-discussed reasons. 
 
One issue is how to lessen the likelihood of imprudent borrowing without reducing the 
benefits that credit cards offer.95 Mann recommenced that “universal default provisions” 
should be banned; these provisions are where an accredited card issuer can unilaterally raise 
the rate on its card if the consumer misses a payment to another creditor. Mann’s work 
concludes that increased disclosure is not sufficient as a remedy and these further measures 
are needed.  
 
Mann also suggests a ban on marketing to minors and college students, similar to that 
imposed in the UK.96 That recommendation was echoed by a number of credit professionals, 
who suggested that marketing of credit cards on university campuses should not be allowed.  
Mann suggests that another policy option would be to subordinate the US Bankruptcy Code’s 
right to recover debts incurred by minors on credit cards, although he notes that such a move 
may create incentives to abuse such a protection.97 Mann found that Canada and the US 
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have the highest card based transactions per capita in the world, six times Japan for 
example, and a third more than the UK. Credit card debt in the US is 40% of all non-
mortgage consumer credit, whereas it is only between 20% and 30% in Canada.98  
 
Some credit card companies increase the affinity benefits (air travel miles or points towards 
purchase of a vehicle or other assets) where the cardholder does not pay his or her bill on 
monthly basis, creating incentives to run up debt without understanding the costs of carrying 
that debt.99 The UK previously had a rule that cardholders had to pay 15% of their credit card 
debt each month, but it was removed in 1978 and card issuers moved the minimum to 5%.100 
In Canada, the amount tends to range between 1.5% and 3% according to the surveyed 
credit professionals. 
 
Canada’s Senate Committee on Banking Trade and Commerce examined issues in respect 
of credit cards in 2009.101 It recommended that the federal government appoint an oversight 
board, within an existing federal organization, that would consult with participants from 
Canada’s credit card and debit card payment systems as well as relevant federal 
stakeholders, including a mandate to make recommendations on any regulatory or legislative 
measures that it considers to be required to ensure fairness for participants in the credit card 
and debit card payment systems. The oversight board would monitor and publish annually 
information on trends in interchange, switch, merchant and other associated payment 
systems fees; and establish a code of conduct for payment systems participants and 
practices for setting fees and rates.102  
 
The Senate Committee was also concerned about a number of industry practices that have 
the effect of increasing the cost of credit. It recommended that the federal government take 
appropriate action to permit surcharging and/or discounting by merchants; require merchants 
to display, at the point of purchase, the amount of any applicable surcharge or discount; 
permit merchants to inform customers about relatively lower-cost payment methods; and 
prohibit any “honour-all-cards” rules, including those that require merchants to accept a 
network operator’s higher-cost premium cards and those that link credit card and debit card 
merchant acceptance.103  It urged the federal government take appropriate action to require 
the calculation of switch and interchange fees on the basis of a flat fee for debit card 
transactions; set the interchange fee at zero for a period of three years for all debit card 
transactions; and prohibit priority routing in order that cardholders are able to select, at the 
point of sale, their preferred payment method when using a co-badged card.104  
 
The Senate Committee further recommended that the government require card issuers to 
disclose, in a clear, simple and conspicuous fashion, the following information on each 
monthly statement: the number of months it would take to pay off the balance owing and the 
cost that would ensue if no further advances and/or purchases were made and if the 
consumer were to make only the minimum monthly payment; the monthly payment required 
to pay off the outstanding balance within 36 months if no further purchases and/or advances 
were made; and the year-to-date total of all interest costs and other fees that have been paid 
and/or accrued from use of the credit card. It recommended that the government should 
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require card issuers to provide cardholders with information about the range of their credit 
card products, including all associated fees and interest rates, and with information that 
would direct the cardholder to the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada’s online credit-card 
selection tool. Finally, the Senate Committee reported that government should direct the 
Financial Consumer Agency of Canada, and provide it with the resources necessary to take a 
more vigorous approach to enforcing existing and future disclosure requirements, requiring 
the agency to monitor and report on card issuer practices, including compliance with new and 
existing federal regulations in respect of disclosure requirements.105  
 
The federal government in 2009 announced new regulations to limit business practices that 
are not beneficial to consumers and to provide clear and timely information to Canadian 
consumers about credit cards. As noted above, effective January 1, 2010, the Credit 
Business Practices (Banks, Authorized Foreign Banks, Trust and Loan Companies, Retail 
Associations, Canadian Insurance Companies and Foreign Insurance Companies) 
Regulations include a number of changes that are intended to increase transparency and 
thereby protect consumers.106 The Credit Business Practices Regulations are aimed at 
limiting business practices of financial institutions that are not beneficial to consumers and 
amending the existing Cost of Borrowing Regulations to improve disclosure.107 The changes 
include requiring a minimum 21-day grace period on new credit card purchases. Providing a 
grace period applies to all new purchases when consumers pay in full in the current month, 
regardless of an outstanding balance the month before. Banks are now to allocate payments 
made in excess of the required minimum using a method that is beneficial to consumers, 
either allocating payments to the balance with the highest interest rate first, or distributing the 
payments based on the relative proportion of each.  
 
The new regulations are aimed at prohibiting federally regulated financial institutions from 
increasing someone’s credit limit unless that person explicitly agrees.108  The rules will also 
place limits on debt collection practices, to ensure a uniform standard that would apply to the 
debt collection practices of all federally regulated financial institutions. Financial institutions 
will be prohibited from imposing a fee when the credit limit is exceeded solely because a hold 
was placed on available credit by the merchant.  
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The new regulations require federally regulated financial institutions to enhance disclosure 
requirements by requiring that for credit contracts and credit card applications, all salient 
information, such as fees and rates, be provided in a summary box, in order to bring the 
information to the consumer’s attention, in turn, improving consumer understanding of the 
implications of only making the minimum payment, enhancing disclosure by showing 
consumers how long it would take to pay off the balance owing on a credit card if they only 
made the minimum payment every month, and providing a clear example monthly of how 
compound interest affects those who pay it.109  The changes will also provide consumers 
advance notice on monthly statements, if interest rates are going to be increased in the short 
term.  This requirement would capture situations such as rate increases following the end of 
low introductory rates or rate increases triggered by the consumer skipping one or more 
minimum payments, thus allowing consumers to act to avoid the increase.110  The policy 
rationale for altering the way that credit card limits are increased is to “assist consumers to 
keep track of their financial situation.”111 
 
Credit managers report that the new provisions are having some effect on consumer debtors, 
in that they are starting to realize the cost of debt they are carrying. Whether that 
understanding will translate into different credit patterns, including reducing the load of 
expensive debt, is too soon to tell.  Such measures do not address many of the underlying 
problems associated with credit card debt, such as insufficient income, job loss and lack of 
alternate lower cost credit as a bridging mechanism at times of income disruption. To date, 
there is no political will to cap the interest rates charged by credit card companies. Hence, 
while the cost of debt will be more transparent, credit card and similar debt will continue to be 
the most accessible form of expensive credit.  
 
 
5. Personal Loans, Lines of Credit and Rising Default Rates 
 
Both regional differences and community economic base are factors in access to personal 
loans and lines of credit.  In agricultural communities, for example, the need for credit is 
highly dependent on the weather, to cover as economic losses suffered from flooding, etc.  In 
communities with a high dependency on social income supports, credit has always been tight 
and continues to be the same. In the west, credit unions observed that it is harder to maintain 
business in smaller communities, as centralized farm credit is siphoning off business. In 
terms of what credit professionals observe regarding changes to access to consumer 
personal loan credit since October 2008, there was relative consistency across the country, 
although some regional differences. Generally, there has been a tightening of personal loans 
and lines of credit, and more diligence in credit assessments. PEI and Saskatchewan 
reported that they did not really change practices after October 2008, and credit counsellors 
in Saskatchewan have observed a drop in files across the province. Managers also observed 
that while early in the crisis, consumers at either end of the age spectrum, i.e. younger adults 
and elderly people, were having the most difficulties, tightened access to credit has now 
spread across all age cohorts. 
 
Most banks and credit unions reported a 70 to 75% approval rate for loans prior to the 
financial crisis, but observe that conditions have tightened and thus the approval rates have 
dropped, although in some instances, they are moving back up in 2011. 80% of the bank and 
credit union managers that were interviewed observed that banks have started to restrict 
access for consumers to personal loans and lines of credit. Households have not been able 
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to gain access to credit to finance their living, many observing that, in their view, consumers 
were previously living beyond their means because of easier access to credit prior to 2008.  
Both managers on the lending side and credit counsellors on the debt assistance side 
generally believed that access to credit had previously been too liberal, and that many 
consumers do not have sufficient cushion in their budget to withstand sudden economic 
shocks such as reduced pay or fluctuating interest rates. 
 
If a consumer is seeking to consolidate all his or her debt with a personal loan from a bank or 
credit union that the consumer has an established relationship with, the consumer is more 
frequently being declined than prior to the financial crisis. Many institutions now will only 
consolidate unsecured debt that is with them, not with other institutions, which may not help 
the client’s overall situation.  Many financial institutions are streamlining their credit 
operations via internet online applications or a scoring system. Creditors are using credit 
reports from the credit bureaus to assess the credit worthiness of potential borrowers; and 
good credit reports can be used as leverage by consumers to obtain lower interest rates and 
reduce the cost of borrowing, although most lenders interviewed report that consumers 
infrequently do so. 
 
In the view of many credit professionals, there is a need to go back to relationship building, 
using face to face interviews to have a full understanding of the consumer debtor’s situation 
before granting credit. Many also expressed the view that creditors should more frequently 
discuss money management and budgeting skills and be prepared to help the consumer in 
that regard so that they can avoid further financial problems. 
 
It is expected that consumer debt costs will increase in the next period, once the prime 
lending rate normalizes, so that loans and lines of credit will be more expensive to service. 
Many managers and credit counsellors observed that households are near the edge of not 
being able to sustain payments now, and are unlikely to handle a significant increase in their 
credit and interest costs. The statistics above regarding job loss seem to support this idea, in 
the sense that there were debtors that were barely managing to service their debts, but a 
change in their economic circumstances pushed them over the edge into insolvency. 
 
Many of the consumer debtors that are in trouble financially now are still dealing with the 
consequences of freely available credit prior to 2008.  In general, the cost of living has far 
exceeded the increase in personal income for the vast majority of consumers; and the 
majority of households have not made the appropriate adjustments to their budget. Most 
consumers are unaware of where is the money going, and few have a strategy to pay off their 
more expensive debt. 
 
Across Canada, credit professionals raised the issue of what could be done to try to reduce 
consumers’ reliance on credit and increase their savings. Studies on personal saving rates 
based on national accounts data have shown that Canadians have been saving less since 
1980, when personal savings rates peaked at 20 percent. Currently, personal saving rates on 
a national accounts basis are 5 percent of disposable income.112 While employment security 
is the largest contributing factor to the ability to save, credit professionals suggested that 
mass advertising promoting immediate consumption has no counter balancing force or 
message in the mass media regarding the value of savings. 
 
The auto industry and its relating financiers are offering even more financing as part of the 
effort to restart the auto sector after its insolvency restructuring. Qualification for credit is set 
at a very low threshold of eligibility, and many consumers, particularly younger consumers, 
are purchasing cars worth $30,000 or more, with loans with payment terms that have gone 
from 36 months to 84 months. There has already been an increase in vehicle repossession in 
Alberta and other provinces, creditors are no longer keeping “bad deals” on the books. Thus, 
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the benefits to the auto sector generated by this long-tail financing may be creating conditions 
for financial distress in the future. 
 
In terms of personal loans, credit counsellors reported a large spike in defaults across 
Canada during 2009 and 2010, when consumer debtors could not live within their existing 
budget any longer. There were many credit professionals that observed that bill collectors 
placed considerable pressure on consumers to pay unsecured debt first and expect the 
consumer to not pay the essentials, like housing costs or food; then the consumer has little 
choice but to use credit cards to meet those needs.  
 
Many consumer debtors have consolidated consumer debt by personal loans, secured by 
their home equity or assets. Consolidation loans can reduce interest costs from more 
expensive debt such as credit card debt and expensive consumer product loans. Yet, credit 
professionals observed that lenders often take little or no steps to educate the client on credit 
use or conditions for the consolidation approval, such as requiring all credit be cancelled to 
avoid the client getting into the same situation again. What happens is that the clients get 
right back into debt, fall behind and then default on the mortgage or other security. 
 
Finally, there were a number of observations about computerized lending and/or “on-line 
loans”, which on the one hand have facilitated credit and on the other may not always offer 
the scrutiny that a face to face lending relationship does.  Managers observed that many 
situations do not fit neatly in the computerized model and that there should be more room for 
discretionary decisions based on other objective factors.  In some cases, managers observed 
that the computer model has approved some deals they would have denied and vice versa.   
 
 
6.  Payday Loans 
 
Payday loans are short-term loans, typically between $300 and $500, advanced against a 
post-dated cheque, which is payable on the borrower’s next payday; loans that typically add a 
number of registration and other fees to the maximum rate legally available, and are often 
refinanced or “rolled over” to the next payday with additional fees payable, making them the 
most expensive source of consumer credit available113 Berry and Duncan observe that one 
study showed that, on average, payday lenders provide 15 repeat or rollover loans for every 
first time loan extended. Provincial payday lending laws and Canada’s Criminal Code section 
347.1 define payday loans as under $1,500, setting a maximum dollar value that is aimed at 
ensuring the loans are captured in payday lending laws. 
 
Payday loans are viewed as both beneficial and harmful.  Consumer debtors become 
involved in a vicious cycle of borrowing and then re-borrow the funds from the same outlet or 
go to a different outlet to get the funds they need to service the first loan.  The overall market 
figures illustrate the size of the industry, although numbers vary somewhat by source 
reporting. The Canadian Payday Loans Association (CPLA) estimates that there are 1,635 
retail outlets providing payday loans in Canada.114 The government of Ontario estimated in 
2009 that there were 1,350 retail outlets in Canada of which 750 are in Ontario.  In a report 
commissioned in by the CPLA in 2004, a survey of loan providers found that loan volumes 
from each retail location generally ranged from less than $1 million to $2.5 million.115 A 2006 
report for the Library of Parliament found the total loan volume could not be determined 
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authoritatively, but estimates ranged between $170 million and $1 billion.116 The government 
of Ontario estimated in 2009 that the national industry loan volume is $2 billion and that the 
average payday loan is $300.117  
 
Two companies dominate the market in Canada. Dollar Financial Corp. is a US company that 
operates retail storefront locations in Canada, the US, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Poland.118 In Canada, they operate as “Money Mart” in nine provinces and the territories, and 
as “Instant Cheques” in Québec.119 As of June 30, 2010, they claimed the largest market 
share in Canada by branch, 31% of market share, reporting 465 financial services stores, 
including 62 franchises, and an estimated 1500 retail outlets in Canada.  In fiscal 2010, their 
Canadian consumer loan originations were US $792,231,000. Their Canadian company 
funded consumer loan revenues were US $147,851,000.  
 
Cash Store Financial (CSF), formerly called Rentcash Inc., operate “The Cash Store” and 
“Instaloan”, with operations primarily in Canada, and a small business in the UK.120 As of 
September 30, 2010, they had 542 retail branches in Canada, claiming to hold 35% of the 
market share by branch and 1550 outlets. In the 12 months prior to September 30, 2010, they 
had a loan volume of $681,400,000, including UK loans; and since they only had two 
branches in the UK, Canadian loans represent most of this volume.121  
 
Neither annual report discloses the number of loans provided. However if one uses the 
Ontario government’s estimated average loan of $300, then DFC may have given 2,640,770 
loans and CSF 2,271,333 loans in the reporting year discussed above. 
 
In the US, the rate of payday lending has rapidly expanded in recent years and the annual 
payday loan volume in the US now exceeds 50 billion USD.122  The number of payday outlets 
is greater that the number of McDonalds and Starbucks outlets combined.123 Payday lending 
requires employment and a chequing account, as the amount is borrowed with the next pay 
cheque as security; the post-date cheque is given at the time of the loan.  Studies have found 
that payday borrowers generally have low but steady incomes and poor credit histories.124 
Payday borrowers are using loans for emergencies, groceries and debt service.125 In the US, 
at least 13 states restrict payday loan terms, imposing outright bans, prohibitions on serial 
payday borrowing, or with binding interest rate caps on payday loans or consumer loans in 
general.126 The market rate for a 2-week payday loan in the US is 390% APR, although fees 
can be higher.127  Serial borrowing under payday loans is very prevalent.128 
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Legislation can temper the harmful effects of payday loan interest rates. One study undertook 
empirical research on the effects of a payday lending cap in Oregon that came into force 
effective 2007. The Oregon cap requires the maximum combination of fees and finance 
charges to be $10 for every $100, with a minimum loan of 31 days (max APR of 150%).129 
The number of payday lending outlets dropped by 2/3 in the first seven months after the cap 
came into force and within two years had dropped from 346 licensed payday loan outlets to 
82.130  The study found that restricting access to consumer credit hinders productive 
investment and/or consumption smoothing over the short term, but was unable to conclude 
that access to expensive credit improves consumer welfare.131 It found that payday interest 
caps dramatically reduced access to credit in the state, and that borrowers shifted into 
incomplete and in some cases inferior substitutes, such as chequing account overdrafts and 
consequent overdraft and late fees, and indirect effects such as utilities shutoffs, account 
closures, and loss of ability to open an account.132 However, the study also found that for the 
remaining outlets, short-term access to credit may have improved for payday borrowers 
because of the lower costs and longer-term payment window.133 It suggested further study 
using proxies for consumer welfare and financial condition, such as postponed medical care, 
forced moves, shutoff of utilities and reactivation fees, hunger and credit score declines.134 
 
In 2007, Berry and Duncan argued that payday advance credit was unlike other short-term 
loans in that the principal was typically due in 14 days or less; and that these loans were 
rolled over, time and time again, incurring higher administration and interest charges and 
becoming a greater burden for the lender.135 They recommended replacement of payday 
loans with a short-term loan or installment loan, so that the consumer debtors might find it 
possible to pay the debt off without having the experience of bankruptcy.136 Berry and 
Duncan observed that the payday borrower who files for bankruptcy tends to be single, 
younger and with a higher income than bankrupts without these loans, and argued that these 
characteristics make the case for consumer education to provide a balance to the presence 
of payday loan establishments in many inner-city and suburban neighbourhoods. Buckland 
observes that the 2005 Survey of Financial Security found that lower-income consumers 
used payday loans more often than other consumers, and that among households who used 
payday lending at least once a month, 52.4% had household income less than $30,000.137 
Berry and Duncan suggest that if traditional lenders provided more accessible services, and 
there was more objective information about payday lenders in public service advertisements, 
these borrowers are more likely to access other lending options, observing that payday 
lenders do not post reliable information about interest rates and rollover provisions in their 
premises or on their Internet sites, thus not allowing consumers to compare rates and 
services accurately.138 Since their study, a number of provinces have enacted legislation, but 
only a few of the identified problems have been addressed.  
 
The Criminal Code was amended in 2006 to allow for provinces to regulate payday loans. 
Section 347.1 specifies: 
 
347.1 (1) The following definitions apply in subsection (2). 
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“interest” has the same meaning as in subsection 347(2). 
“payday loan” means an advancement of money in exchange for a post-dated 
cheque, a pre-authorized debit or a future payment of a similar nature but not for 
any guarantee, suretyship, overdraft protection or security on property and not 
through a margin loan, pawnbroking, a line of credit or a credit card. 
(2) Section 347 and section 2 of the Interest Act do not apply to a person, other 
than a financial institution within the meaning of paragraphs (a) to (d) of the 
definition“ financial institution” in section 2 of the Bank Act, in respect of a payday 
loan agreement entered into by the person to receive interest, or in respect of 
interest received by that person under the agreement, if 
(a) the amount of money advanced under the agreement is $1,500 or less and the 
term of the agreement is 62 days or less; 
(b) the person is licensed or otherwise specifically authorized under the laws of a 
province to enter into the agreement; and 
(c) the province is designated under subsection (3).139 
 
 
There are two types of payday loan statutes that have now been enacted provincially. In 
Alberta and Saskatchewan, the statutes are aimed at regulating the cost of credit in general. 
These statutes have sections that apply to fixed credit, but not payday loans specifically, and 
they do not require licensing of payday lenders. The second type, in force in British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova Scotia, apply directly to payday lenders. With the exception of 
British Columbia, they require lender licensing. New Brunswick’s initiative to enact legislation 
in 2007 appears to have stalled before it was proclaimed in force.140   
 
Consumer protection provisions in both types of statutes involve many of the following 
features: requirements for the loan agreement; a provision that ambiguities in loan 
agreements are to be interpreted in favour of the borrower; increased disclosure when 
advertising interest rates or interest free periods; disclosure of changes to the loan 
agreement; restrictions on default charges; restrictions on brokerage fees; the ability of the 
consumer borrower to cancel loan within 48 hours and the ability to pay loan in full without 
penalty; eligibility for refund of fees paid in contravention of the statute; prohibition of 
rollovers, loans in excess of income, wage assignments, and requiring security for loans; and 
establishment of funds for consumer education. 
 
i. Caps on Lending 
 
The British Columbia Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act Part 6.1 sets interest 
limits between 23% and 30%, setting out other conditions.141  Alberta and Saskatchewan 
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accept from the borrower or consumer any amount that exceeds a maximum set or determined under 
subsection (1). Pursuant to the Payday Loans Regulation, BC Reg 57/2009, Permissible charges: 
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have set similar limits on interest and a cap on the amount of income on which the loan can 
be secured.142 Section 14(3) of the regulations accompanying the Ontario Payday Loans Act 
specifies that the maximum cost per $100 borrowed is $21.143 Manitoba has set the lowest 
cap, at 17%.144   
 
In reality, payday lenders in regulated provinces can charge more than the criminal usury limit 
under Canada’s Criminal Code.  Payday lenders are exempted from that federal limit, while 
being subject to the provincial limit.  The criminal interest rate of 60% is different than the 
provincial maximum costs of borrowing limit as the criminal interest rate as defined in the 
Criminal Code is an annualized rate.  Some provincial payday lending laws, such as Ontario, 
set a flat percentage regardless of the term of the loan. The federal Office of Consumer 
Affairs explains the difference is as follows: the maximum charge for a $100 loan, probably 
due within two weeks, will be $17-25, depending on the regulating province, the provincial 
                                                                                                                                            
17 (1)  The maximum amount that may be charged, required or accepted by a payday lender for a loan 
is 23% of the principal. (2)  In addition to subsection (1), if the repayment amount specified in the 
agreement is not paid, a payday lender may charge an amount up to the following maximum amounts 
as default fees: (a) interest at a rate of 30% per annum on the outstanding principal; (b) a one time fee 
of $20 for a dishonoured cheque or a dishonoured pre-authorized debit. (3)  The maximum charges 
under this section include all amounts collected directly or indirectly from the borrower….Prohibited 
practices — maximum repayment: 23 (1)  In this section, pay period means (a) the period from the 
date on which the payday loan is entered into until the day on which the borrower next receives his or 
her pay or other income, or (b) a period during the term of a payday loan from the day on which a 
borrower receives his or her pay or other income until the day on which the borrower next receives his 
or her pay or other income. (2)  A payday lender who enters into a third or subsequent payday loan 
agreement with a borrower in a 62-day period must, (a) if the borrower is paid or otherwise receives 
income on a bi-weekly, semi-monthly or more frequent basis, provide in the loan agreement that 
repayment is to be spread over at least 3 pay periods, or (b) if the borrower is paid or otherwise 
receives income on a less frequent basis than that referred to in paragraph (a), provide in the loan 
agreement that repayment is to be spread over at least 2 pay periods. (3)  A payday lender must not 
require a repayment under a loan agreement referred to in subsection (2) that is more than, (a) for a 
borrower referred to in paragraph (a) of that subsection, 35% of the sum of the principal and the cost of 
borrowing in relation to the loan, or (b) for a borrower referred to in paragraph (b) of that subsection, 
50% of the sum of the principal and the cost of borrowing in relation to the loan. (4)  This section does 
not apply with respect to a payday loan that is made in anticipation of income that is to be received by 
the borrower as a lump sum on a one-time basis during the term of the payday loan. 
142
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limit.  If one were to calculate an annualized percentage for that loan, the percentage rate 
would exceed 60% because the term of the payday loan is so short, far shorter than a 
year.145 Thus while the provincial caps are a first step, they do little to temper the high 
amounts of interest that continue to be charged to individuals using payday loans. 
 
Interestingly, in the Newfoundland and Labrador government’s decision not to enact a 
provincial payday lending statute, the government observed as follows:  
 
“After significant research and careful consideration, the Provincial Government has 
decided not to regulate payday loan companies operating in Newfoundland and 
Labrador. Rather, it will uphold the maximum interest rate set out in section 347 of 
the Criminal Code of Canada, which is 60 per cent per annum, as the maximum rate 
to be charged by payday loan companies. “As a government, we could not in good 
conscience implement regulations that potentially could result in annual interest rates 
equating to nearly 550 per cent being charged to consumers in our province,” said 
the Honourable Kevin O’Brien, Minister of Government Services. “By putting in place 
provincial regulations for payday loan companies that permit annual interest charges 
above 60 per cent, we would not be protecting consumers’ best interests. We do not 
want individuals being gouged or putting themselves more in debt and having a hard 
time catching up because of high interest rates for these types of short-term loans. 
We have reviewed the terms and conditions relating to maximum interest rates 
outlined in the Criminal Code of Canada, as well as regulations of other provinces 
and territories for payday lenders, and have decided that payday loan companies in 
this province will continue to be subject to section 347 of the Criminal Code of 
Canada.”146  
 
Hence the Newfoundland and Labrador government, by not adopting provincial payday 
provisions, has in fact taken a tougher line on payday loan interest caps than the provincial 
governments that have enacted legislation.   
 
However, in addition to the important issue of caps on interest, the provincial statutes have 
enacted a number of important consumer protection provisions that will address a number of 
identified problems associated with payday loans. 
 
ii. Cost of Credit Statutes 
 
The Alberta Fair Trading Act does not require licensing of lenders.147 Section 62 requires the 
credit grantor to disclose the information required by the statute and regulations to the 
borrower. Borrowers are entitled to cancel any optional continuing service with 30 days 
written notice.148 Borrowers can pay the full balance on any non-mortgage loan without 
incurring any penalties.149 In addition, s. 72 specifies that any duties that apply to lenders also 
apply to loan brokers and requires disclosure of brokerage fees.  If the borrower defaults, the 
statute limits the charges to reasonable costs incurred by the lender for things such as legal 
fees.150  For fixed credit, if an advertisement states the interest rate or claims that there is an 
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interest free period, they must disclose information required by the regulations. If not done, 
the interest-free period is deemed unconditionally interest free.151 There are also 
requirements to disclose any changes to the interest rate or credit agreement.152 Section 96 
requires the refund of any amount paid in non-compliance with the Act. 
 
The Saskatchewan Cost of Credit Disclosure Act specifies that any duties that apply to a 
lender also apply to the loan broker, and any brokerage fees must be included in the APR 
calculation for fixed credit.153 A borrower can cancel any optional continuing services, and 
repay any outstanding balance without penalty.154 The amount a lender can charge for a loan 
in default is restricted to the reasonable amount incurred to collect payment or for related 
legal costs.155  Part III applies specifically to fixed credit. It places disclosure requirements on 
advertising that states the interest rate, payment amount, or that there is an interest-free 
period.156 Criteria for the written agreement include the term of the agreement, the interest 
rate, and nature of other charges among other criteria.157 The borrower can also recover 
payments made contrary to the statute.158 
 
iii. Payday Loan Statutes 
 
Pursuant to the British Columbia Business Practices and Consumer Protection Act, the 
consumer debtor has until the end of the next business day after receiving the loan to 
cancel.159 Section 112.06 specifies detail provisions that should be included in the written 
agreement, such as the principal, term, and APR of the loan. Specific to the British Columbia 
statute is the requirement that payments must be first put towards interest, then to other 
permissible charges, and finally to the principal itself.160  The borrower is not liable to pay fees 
to a lender that contravenes the statute, and borrowers are entitled to a refund if they pay 
such fees in excess of what they truly owe.161 The statute also contains a relatively long list of 
prohibited activities for payday lenders, such as rollovers, loans in excess of income, 
accepting assignment of wages, or requiring real or personal property as security for the loan. 
There is no licensing requirement, and no mention of brokers and fees they can charge; nor 
are there any specific sections relating to fees that can be charged on default of the loan. 
 
Part 18 of the Manitoba Consumer Protection Act is specific to payday loans.162 Lenders 
need a license to provide loans,163 and the documents provided at the initial advance must 
fulfill certain criteria, including the statement that the loan is a high cost loan.164 Any 
ambiguous terms are to be interpreted against the lender.165 The borrower may cancel the 
loan with 24 hours with no fees.166 In addition, wage assignments and loans in excess of net 
pay are forbidden.167 No charges are payable on default unless allowed by the regulations,168 
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and brokerage fees must be disclosed and included in the calculation of the APR.169 There is 
no liability for the borrower if he or she does not make payments that contravene the Act.170 
The Act also establishes the Manitoba Payday Borrowers’ Financial Literacy Fund, funded by 
levies in the Act and funds the Legislature decides to assign.171 
 
The Ontario Payday Loans Act is the lengthiest of the payday loans statutes, enacted in 
2008.172  The licensing requirements and conditions are extensive.173  The statute contains 
numerous provisions aimed at the protection of borrowers.174  Loan brokers cannot charge for 
assisting a borrower to obtain a payday loan, the loan agreement must meet any prescribed 
requirements, and the borrower can cancel an agreement until the second day after the 
requirements of the agreement are met.175  The Act restricts the charges that can be levied 
on borrowers who default on their loans to reasonable charges related to legal costs and 
those that the lender incurs related to the default.176  Any ambiguities in the interpretation of 
the loan agreement will benefit the borrower,177 and the statute sets out how the registrar is to 
deal with complaints about a licensee.178 Lastly, section 66 establishes the Ontario Payday 
Lending Education Fund, which is contributed to by fees from the licensees and money 
received from “any other source”.   
 
Finally, the Nova Scotia Consumer Protection Act is relatively short, but a number of sections 
apply specifically to payday loans, including requiring a permit to lend.179  Lenders must give 
a written statement meeting specified requirements to the borrower, including the date on 
which repayment is due and an itemization of all fees.180  There are a number of specified 
prohibitions in respect of payday loans, such as requiring security, providing a loan in excess 
of the borrower’s income, granting rollovers, and penalizing a borrower who pays the loan in 
full.181  The borrower is not liable for fees required by the lender in contravention of the Act,182 
and the borrower can cancel the loan until the end of the next business day after it is 
borrowed.183 
 
Hence, the standards and practices are highly uneven across Canada, both in terms of 
interest rate caps for payday loans and the breadth of consumer protection provisions 
offered.  Arguably, this unevenness creates unfairness to consumer debtors, based on the 
region in which they live.  The unevenness is partially due to the ability of payday loan 
industry advocates to influence legislative change and to the fact that organizations 
representing consumer debtors have limited resources and face information asymmetries in 
their efforts to try to protect consumer debtors.   
 
Buckland observes that the growth in numbers of payday loan outlets in Canada is the only 
most prominent example of the growth of “fringe bank” lenders, and that other forms of credit, 
such as rent-to-own, auto and regular pawn shops, income tax refund advancers, and 
second-hand ‘buy-back’ schemes are growing in number in Canadian inner-cities, offering a 
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form of credit when consumer debtors cannot access affordable credit from banks, affordable 
meaning credit that more closely resembles interest rates and fees charged to middle-income 
debtors.184  He suggests that such lenders are convenient and accessible, but their fees are 
high in comparison with more traditional credit. Buckland found that payday loans, rent-to-
own arrangements, and pawn loans often involve fees that amount to 250% to 750% APR.185     
 
 
7.   Financial Literacy 
 
In this study, as in a number of others, financial literacy was indentified as a significant 
concern. Financial literacy is defined as “having the knowledge, skills and confidence to make 
responsible financial decisions.”186  
 
The large data set of 4,000 insolvent consumer debtors revealed considerable issues in 
financial literacy, with many references in the declared causes to not understanding the debt 
load, inability to manage finances, failure to have any kind of budget, and multiple and 
unsustainable monthly payments.  Many credit professionals interviewed observed that there 
is far too little consumer financial literacy training to counterbalance cultural pressures to 
spend now on credit. Almost universally, bank managers, credit union managers and credit 
counsellors discussed the need for more consumer education regarding interest and 
repayment terms and real costs of payday loans, credit card debt, home equity finance loans 
and personal loans, so that consumers are informed when comparing rates and overall costs. 
One manager observed that while clients compare interest rates, they generally only take into 
account interest rates and not whether they can pay the debt off or how they will be treated at 
both the loan granting stage and later in the lending relationship.  
 
Consumers should be given a better appreciation of both hard and soft costs associated with 
borrowing. Financial literacy should be acquired at school age, but also as part of life-long 
learning, to understand budgeting and in order not to be unnecessarily charged for financing 
fees and high interest rates.  One repeated observation was that there are uneven rules for 
payday lending, which is not prudentially regulated, and thus issues of transparency of loan 
costs, etc. are different. 
 
A recent Canadian Financial Capability Survey (Statistics Canada 2009) reports that one third 
of participants did not know what happens to their buying power when the inflation rate is 
higher than the interest they earn on an investment. 187  Nearly one quarter did not track their 
finances or plan ahead for retirement; and more than one third admitted they are struggling 
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with keeping up with their budgeting decisions.188 US studies have shown that debt literacy is 
low, particularly among the elderly, women, minorities and consumers with low income and 
wealth; and that consumers with lower levels of debt literacy tend to transact in a high cost 
way, incurring high interest rate borrowing and user fees.189 Debt literacy is defined as the 
ability to make simple decisions regarding debt contracts, applying basic knowledge about 
interest compounding, measured in the context of daily financial choices.190 Lusardi and 
Tufano have estimated that less knowledgeable consumers in the US pay 46% more fees 
that do the financially literate.191  Moreover, their studies have documented that consumers 
tend to self-report higher debt literacy than they actually possess.192 
 
The Canadian Government commissioned the Task Force on Financial Literacy (TFFL), with 
a mandate to find strategies to strengthen the financial literacy of various segments of the 
population.193  It found that individuals that are at particular risk of becoming victims of 
financial fraud include the elderly, the immigrant community, and consumers living on low 
income and with high levels of debt.194 In February 2011, the Task Force proposed a national 
strategy with five priorities: shared responsibility for financial literacy; coordination of 
initiatives with multi-stakeholder participation; lifelong financial learning, commencing at 
school and through key life events; resources and innovative approaches to raise the 
awareness of good financial behaviour; accountability, with progress and impact of 
interventions measured by solid indicators.195  
 
TFFL observed that “teachable moments” in life regarding credit include decision points such 
as joining a pension plan or workplace retirement savings scheme, seeking financial advice 
or considering the purchase of a financial product, or determining one’s eligibility for benefits 
from a government program.196  It found that even for those consumer debtors’ with the 
information and education they need to make sound financial decisions, a wide range of 
psychological, social and institutional influences can impede rational decision making.197 
TFFL focused on how individuals can navigate the ever-changing financial marketplace and 
buy the products and services that make the most sense for their own needs; the report 
making the assumption that individuals have the resources to do so. 
 
TFFL reported that 49.8% of adult Canadians struggle with simple tasks involving math and 
numbers; and 42% of adult Canadians struggle with reading.198 Although informational 
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materials regarding credit are readily available to consumers, much of this material is 
complex and is not presented in simple, accessible language. TFFL found that financial 
services providers have a responsibility to ensure that their informational materials are 
developed, written and designed to be readily understood; and institutions should have well-
trained front-line and advisory staff that can provide accurate information and helpful 
guidance to customers.199 
 
Among the 55 credit professionals interviewed, a number reported some linguistic issues 
regarding banking practices for consumer debtors and bankrupts whose first language is not 
English or French. They observed that immigrants do not necessarily have experience with 
debt and credit as they frequently come from countries that do not have consumer credit 
systems. They can get into a lot of trouble relatively quickly without consumer debt training.   
 
TFFL recommended that provincial and territorial governments integrate financial literacy in 
the formal education system.200 For employees experiencing financial strain, employee 
assistance programs should offer access to personalized financial crisis counselling.201 It has 
recommended making loans, mortgages and credit, including alternatives such as payday 
loans and “buy now, pay later” schemes, eligible for approval only after the consumer has 
had a face-to-face meeting with the creditor in which the borrowing details and the cost of 
credit are carefully explained.202  
 
There are a number of international models for life-learning of financial literacy. For example, 
Austria issues a “financial driver’s license” called Fit for Money, a program that mainly covers 
debt prevention.203 Australia’s financial literacy curriculum covers the nature and forms of 
money, how to apply financial knowledge in a range of contexts, the ability to manage risk-
taking, and the importance of making responsible financial decisions.204 Japan has one of the 
most comprehensive financial literacy curricula, integrating financial education with core 
subjects such as mathematics from grade 1 through high school.205 
 
Many bank and credit union managers observed that people are becoming much more aware 
of how long it will take to get everything paid off; and that the new rules that the government 
passed requiring the banks to tell consumers how long, in years and months, it will take to 
pay off their debts, have really helped consumers become more aware of their financial 
situation. Consumers are starting to appreciate how long it will take to pay things off, such as 
paying the interest on their line of credit but not taking out any more money.  
 
As financial products become more complex and people assume greater responsibility for 
their retirement savings with the diminution in access to registered pension plans, reliance on 
investment advisors has been more prevalent. More than half of respondents to a 2009 
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) Investor Index Survey indicated that they relied on 
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a financial advisor for investment information.206 TFFL recommended that individuals need to 
know more about the role and obligations of financial practitioners, including assessing 
clients’ needs, identifying their objectives, preparing retirement plans, and allocating savings 
to various investment vehicles suitable for their risk-tolerance profile.207 TFFL encourages, as 
a supplementary tool, the adoption of mechanisms prompting employees to maximize their 
retirement savings through “auto-enrolment” and “auto-escalation” programs.208  However, 
the Task Force made no mention of advisors’ obligations, fiduciary or otherwise, an area in 
need of considerably more research and policy discussion.  
 
Yet the TFFL report was not comprehensive in its recommendations. In a background 
research report for the TFFL, Buckland identified four principal ways in which financial literacy 
needs vary.209 He observed that greater financial literacy is needed to deal with the growing 
complexity of our economy, often related to the increasing role of financial markets in 
everything from pension savings to self-directed investments.210  Buckland’s survey of the 
literature found that financial literacy needs vary over the course of one’s life, the very young 
and very old have modest financial literacy needs, when they are borrowing from others or 
from their own savings, and young and middle-aged adults have relatively greater financial 
literacy needs because of the need to make strategic investment decisions about retirement 
savings. However, Buckland argues that financial position and financial goals vary among 
people at any point in time, and thus affect financial literacy needs as well.211 
 
Buckland made a series of comprehensive recommendations that were not endorsed by the 
TFFL. While space here does not permit an analysis, they warrant brief mention as they 
make the linkage between financial literacy and access to affordable credit. Buckland 
suggests that for indicators of financial literacy to be meaningful, they must measure 
something that is important to people, linking their financing, credit and other needs with 
literacy education. Basic financial literacy education should combine the knowledge, skills, 
and attitude needed by low- and modest middle-income groups, and advanced literacy 
training might include what is needed by wealthier segments of the population.212 Second, he 
suggests that financial services need to be more accessible for low-income people as there is 
an important cause-and-effect issue in the relationship between financial literacy, access to 
financial services, and well-being; and the design of literacy policy needs to take account of 
these linkages.213 Buckland recommends that the government should promote financial 
literacy programs for low-income people that to a significant extent meet their felt needs in a 
convenient way, either as a component of other programs or as stand-alone programs.214  
 
Significant for this paper, Buckland recommends that the federal government require 
mainstream banks to demonstrate a contribution to financial inclusion, by requiring the banks 
to contribute to a financial inclusion fund funded by the banking industry, which would be 
used to support financial inclusion such as access to credit and savings accounts; and he 
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recommends that the federal government should regulate fringe banks as they do with 
mainstream banks, in order to protect low-income consumers.  He recommends that point-of-
sale financial literacy should be promoted through Canadian government programs and 
banks, as that is when consumer debtors are most likely to be engaged such that the 
information is retained. Buckland also recommends that the government require staff at 
relevant agencies and financial institutions be trained on the financial needs and barriers 
faced by low-income people.215  
 
 
8.  Financial Institutions Taking Responsibility for Credit Granted and for Creating More 
Accessible Affordable Credit 
 
The evidence shows that there is a problem with consumer debt being granted on terms such 
that little or no realistic possibility of repayment exists.  In addition, credit is being granted in 
situations where the consumer, if there is any sudden shock, such as illness or economic 
downturn, will not be able to repay creditors and will likely end up in insolvency proceedings 
of some kind.  Taken individually, credit granting institutions may say that they assessed the 
individual’s ability to repay their loan at the interest and fees they offer, but no institution or 
agency is taking any responsibility for the collective debt burdens assumed by consumer 
debtors, which are growing beyond their ability to repay. It is beyond the scope of this report 
to offer detailed policy recommendations as to how these problems may be addressed; 
however, it seems clear that these trends will impact the degree and number of insolvencies 
by consumer debtors under the BIA. Consideration should be given to policy instruments that 
may address these issues. 
 
Buckland et al report that income-levels affect consumer debtors’ experience with banks and 
what they refer to as “fringe banks”.216 Fringe banks such as payday lenders, rent-to-own 
businesses and sub-prime credit card issuers, scored poorly on information accessibility and 
understandability, particularly payday lenders.217 The low-income shoppers received little 
written material, did not feel that the teller was eager for their business, and were often not 
encouraged to arrange a follow-up meeting.218 In contrast, community banking projects 
offered a more positive experience of banking services for low-income people, providing a set 
of simplified services appropriate for the needs of low-income people.219  Their empirical 
study found that there were a couple of mainstream banks that all shoppers consistently had 
positive experiences with, demonstrating that it is possible for mainstream banks to provide a 
supportive atmosphere for clients from low-income backgrounds.220  Buckland et al 
recommend development of a more holistic notion of basic banking that services the needs of 
low-income people, including access to the type of services other people access, such as 
savings and access to credit.221  
 
In another study, Buckland examined the availability of affordable credit in seven countries, 
offering an excellent analysis of the range of types of more affordable and accessible credit 
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that could be developed by banks and credit unions in Canada.222  Examples include the no 
interest loans scheme and step-up programs in Australia; the goal of these projects is to 
demonstrate that small loans can be delivered at a fraction of the fees charged by fringe 
banks.223  In Belgium, banks and credit unions have offered small consumer loans packaged 
with financial advice and support designed to allow low income individuals who are unable to 
obtain bank loans because of low income, welfare receipt, to improve their daily wellbeing 
and overcome social exclusion.224  Buckland notes that a European Commission country 
study concluded that "this pilot project has been a clear success: good repayment rates, 
satisfying legitimate financing needs, a strong social impact through the financing provided (a 
better quality of life, enhanced self confidence and the enhanced employability of a 
substantial number of customers) and in terms of preventing over-indebtedness.225  France 
has banks offering consumer micro-loans and has a government program of loan guarantees 
of half the value of loans, in order to encourage banks to provide credit to people who 
otherwise lack access to mainstream bank credit.226  In the UK, HM Treasury has a strategy 
to get banks to create more accessible services, including a Growth Fund to assist credit 
unions and community development financial institutions to provide affordable loans to 
vulnerable consumers. 227  Buckland’s cataloguing of these programs offers a wealth of ideas 
that would enhance credit availability and decision making in Canada. 
 
Buckland suggests that there are generally two types of consumer loans that offer affordable 
credit for vulnerable consumers. First, are social consumer micro-loan programs that have 
economic and social objectives, with little or low interest rates and longer (1 to 3 year) 
repayment periods. He observes that these services do not cover their costs and so require 
additional resources from elsewhere, often from the state and non-profit organizations.228  
The second type of loan, a consumer micro-loan, is closer in character to a payday loan, but 
is generally offered by an financial institution, with terms that are close to those found with 
other mainstream bank credit products (e.g., credit cards and lines of credit), including 
interest rates between 11% and 36% APR, sizes ranging from $50 to over $5,000, but most 
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ranging from $100 to $1,000. Buckland observes that, in some cases, these loans mimic the 
payday loan two-week period and in other cases, they have longer repayment terms of three 
to twelve months, and they are offered in a manner that allows the lender to cover its costs in 
the short or longer term, yet offer credit on much less expensive terms that payday loans.  
Buckland’s work offers a comprehensive set of strategies that have yet to be taken up in most 
parts of Canada, and which deserve immediate public policy attention if we are to create 
more affordable credit. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 
The issues surrounding consumer access to credit and consumer indebtedness are complex 
and difficult. Access to consumer credit is influenced by many factors, such as amount and 
security of the consumer’s income, and credit card company and financial institution 
practices. Access is also driven by numerous social, cultural and cognitive factors, including 
consumer understanding of the cost of credit; perceptions regarding ability to repay; cognitive 
influences regarding immediate consumption and delayed payment; understanding of the 
benefits and risks of debt to economic security; and the conflicts of interest inherent in the 
business of lending. Overall, bank and credit union credit has tightened since the global 
financial crisis.  For many Canadians, there is access to credit, but not access at reasonable 
cost and on reasonable terms.   
 
Much of the reported need for credit in the past two years has been the need to bridge 
income loss from job loss, reduced hours of employment and small business failures, which 
make access to credit integrally linked to employment policy.  Many individuals that could not 
access personal loans from their bank or credit union turned to alternate, more expensive, 
forms of credit, such as merchandise finance company loans, increasing credit card debt, 
skipping monthly payments on loans, and payday loans.  Consolidation loans have been 
increasingly viewed as a debt management strategy, yet there are problems associated with 
consolidation. The growth in home equity lines of credit, originally intended to bridge 
financing for emergencies or a significant purchase, are now being used more akin to 
account withdrawing, portending future issues in respect to debt load and longer term 
economic security. 
 
Consumers face the direct costs of high interest rate charges and loan and broker fees. 
There is evidence to suggest that costs that increase when consumer borrowers do not 
understand how interest rates and terms work, and thus may be paying considerably more for 
their credit than they may need to. The lack of financial literacy is a major concern in that 
many consumer debtors do not fully appreciate the costs of carrying expensive credit. There 
are also significant indirect costs to the consumer, such as foregone basic necessities 
because of excessive debt load, health costs associated with the stress of over-
indebtedness, and the costs to society, borne by creditors or the general tax base, when 
consumers default on loans or file for insolvency or bankruptcy.  
 
There is also evidence that the consumer debtor does not understand that the lender’s 
interest is in selling its own product and appropriately pricing it risk, and it is not in any kind of 
fiduciary relationship with the consumer borrower. 
 
While this paper suggests some initial measures that would address the problem of 
expensive credit, considerably more research and policy development is required to make 
consumer access to credit more understandable, affordable and accessible on a fair and 
reasonable basis. While financial literacy is an important goal, there is also an urgent need 
for the federal government to complement its current work in financial literacy with a much 
more comprehensive program regarding consumer credit. 
 
 
